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ABSTRACT
FEES, GOING CONCERN OPINIONS AND AUDITOR DISMISSALS:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
By
Frances A. Stott
Auditors issue going concern modified opinions when there is substantial doubt
about the company’s ability to continue its operations into the foreseeable future.
Companies frequently respond to this type of audit opinion by changing auditors. Critics,
such as the SEC, suggest that this may be done in order to opinion shop (i.e., find an
auditor who is likely to issue a more favorable unqualified opinion). However, prior
research has indicated that opinion shopping may not be effective. Since firms receiving
a going concern modified opinion are clearly under significant financial distress, the
effect a change in auditor has on subsequent fees (both audit and non-audit services
(hereafter NAS)) after the issuance of such an opinion is an important question. If there
is an increase in fees that result from changing auditors after a going concern modified
opinion, this suggests there may be other motivations for changing auditors after a going
concern modified opinion.
The primary purpose of this study was to derive possible explanations why firms
dismiss their auditors after a going concern modified opinion. To accomplish this, I
examined five research questions in the post-SOX period. First, I examined the relation
between the issuance of a first-time going concern modified opinion and audit and NAS
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fees. Second, I examined the relation between the issuance of a first-time going concern
modified opinion and auditor dismissal. Third, I examined the relation between auditor
dismissal and audit and NAS fees. Fourth, I examined if there was a moderating effect of
the issuance of a going concern modified opinion on the relation between auditor
dismissals and audit and NAS fees. Finally, I examined why firms might purchase
additional NAS from their new auditor after the issuance of a going concern modified
opinion.
Using multivariate regression analysis and a sample of 48,414 firm-year
observations for the period 2004 – 2014 (sample included all publicly traded U.S.
companies except financial institutions and utilities), my results indicated that there was a
significant relation between the issuance of a first-time GCMO and audit fees. Contrary
to expectations however, this relation was found to be negative indicating that these
distressed firms actually incurred lower audit fees after receiving a GCMO. No
significant relationship was found between the issuance of a first-time GCMO and NAS
fees. In addition, consistent with prior literature, a positive relationship was found
between a first-time GCMO and auditor dismissal.
While a significant negative relationship was found between auditor dismissal and
both audit and NAS fees, that relationship was no longer significant when a GCMO was
present suggesting that firms who dismiss their auditors after a first-time GCMO do not
experience a decrease in either audit fees or NAS fees. Furthermore, the evidence
indicates that NAS were not purchased to compensate auditors for any additional risk or
to compensate the auditor for lowballing, and NAS were not purchased in order to
receive a better audit opinion.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Many studies have examined the effect of issuing a going concern modified
opinion on audit fees, the effect of issuing a going concern modified opinion on changing
auditors, and the effect of a change in auditor on both audit and non-audit service
(hereafter NAS) fees. However, no studies have examined the extent to which the
issuance of a going concern opinion moderates the relation between a change in auditor
and audit fees. Current research on the effect of issuing a going concern modified
opinion on audit and NAS fees has produced varying results. The results in these studies
generally indicate a positive relation between the issuance of a going concern modified
opinion and audit fees while the relation between the issuance of a going concern
modified opinion and NAS fees has not been specifically examined in the extant
literature.1 Additionally, previous studies have consistently indicated a positive
relationship between the issuance of a going concern modified opinion and a change in
auditor while the effect of changing auditors on audit fees has also varied depending on
the variables being studied, the theories being examined and the time period of each
study. Once again, few studies have examined the effect of a change in auditor on NAS
fees.2 Prior literature also suggests that opinion shopping after a going concern modified
opinion is not successful indicating there are other possible reasons why firms change
auditors after receiving a going concern modified opinion.

1

Some prior NAS studies have included GCMO as a control variable, but have not done any detailed
analysis of the impact of this variable.
2
Once again, the few NAS studies that used auditor changes used it as a control variable and found no
significant relationship.

1

2
A required part of the audit process includes the auditor assessing whether the
company will be able to continue to operate as a going concern. In other words, is the
overall financial condition of the company sound enough for the company to continue its
operations for a reasonable period of time?3 If the auditor does not believe the company
has the ability to continue as a going concern, the auditors must add an explanatory
paragraph to their audit report explaining that the auditor questions the future viability of
the company. This is referred to as a going concern modified opinion (hereafter GCMO).
When a company receives a GCMO, there is a tendency to change auditors
(Ettredge, Li & Scholz, 2007). Changing auditors is not a new phenomenon – companies
have been switching audit firms since the inception of independent public accounting
audits in the United States for a variety of reasons including the desire for a different
audit opinion. The SEC started addressing the issue of opinion shopping with a request
for comments in July 1985 (SEC, 1985).4 Prior research has provided evidence that
opinion shopping is unlikely to be successful which suggests there are other explanations
for why firms change auditors after a GCMO (e.g., Chow & Rice, 1982; Krishnan &
Stephens, 1995).
Assuming the accuracy of a first-time GCMO, the firm receiving a first-time
GCMO is experiencing significant financial distress, which poses higher risks for the
current or new auditor. Prior research indicates that firms in distress that receive a
GCMO may experience a change in audit fees whether they change auditors or not (e.g.,

3
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards state that a reasonable period of time should not extend beyond
one year after the date of the financial statements being audited (AU 341.02). The new GAAP standard
discussed below (Subtopic 205-40) specifically requires an entity’s management to evaluate the entity’s
ability to continue as a going concern for one year after the date the financial statements are issued.
4
Prior research defines opinion shopping as shopping for a better opinion from a different audit firm after
receiving a less than desirable audit opinion from the current auditor (Krishnan & Stephens, 1995).
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Munsif, Raghunandan, Rama & Singhvi, 2011; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). In
addition, a change in NAS fees could also occur. Overall, if there is a change in audit
and NAS fees that result from auditor dismissal after a GCMO, the motivation for the
auditor dismissal becomes even more perplexing. My study has attempted to provide
evidence on this complex story through an analysis of not just audit fees but also NAS
fees.
As noted, the impact of the issuance of a GCMO on NAS fees has not been
examined in the extant literature. Three plausible explanations are examined in this study
requiring empirical investigation to clarify and fill the gap in the literature on the
dynamics underlying GCMOs, auditor dismissals, and fee effects. First, NAS fees could
decrease when a client changes auditor as NAS are often not purchased in the initial year
of the auditor engagement. Second, NAS fees could increase if the client seeks additional
services from their audit firm to address the issues that caused their going concern
problems. Finally, NAS fees could also increase when there is a change in auditor if the
company is attempting to “bribe” the new auditor for a better opinion with additional
NAS fees.
Many studies examined the relation between NAS fees and the issuance of a
GCMO (e.g., Schneider, Church & Ely, 2006; Carson et al., 2013; Sharma, 2014).
However, the existing research in this area focused on the issuance of a GCMO as the
dependent variable. While there are several studies that examine the effect of the
issuance of a GCMO on audit fees, there have been no studies that specifically examine
the effect of the issuance of a GCMO on NAS fees. Without empirical evidence, we do
not know whether the resulting relation is positive or negative. One argument would be
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that the issuance of a GCMO would have a positive effect on NAS fees if a company was
seeking additional help from their auditors to address the conditions that resulted in their
GCMO or maybe the company increases the amount of NAS fees to gain a more
favorable audit opinion in the future. As noted above, companies receiving a GCMO are
by assumption in financial distress. Therefore, an alternative explanation might be that
the company would reduce their NAS in order to reduce overall costs, which would result
in a negative relation between the issuance of a GCMO and NAS fees.
I started by examining the relations between GCMOs, audit and NAS fees and
auditor dismissals in the post-SOX period. Prior research has primarily examined these
relations in a pre-SOX environment. However, after SOX, auditors were not permitted to
perform many NAS. In addition, there are legal requirements imposed by SOX as well as
litigation risks executives now face, suggesting that the results of prior studies in the preSOX period may not be generalizable or hold in the post-SOX period. Due to the
unprecedented changes in the governance of the audit environment, findings in pre-SOX
studies should be re-examined (Carson et al., 2013; Sharma, 2014). In fact, other areas of
auditing research have done this and found results that were either conflicting or
consistent, depending on the issue (e.g., Ferguson, Lam & Ma, 2017; Griffin, Lont &
Sun, 2017). Furthermore, the concept of differentiated replication has also been called
for in recent studies (e.g., Carcello, Hermanson & Ye, 2011; Dyckman & Zeff, 2014;
DeFond & Zhang, 2015). My analysis of these relations in a post-SOX environment
provide evidence on whether findings in prior research are empirically generalizable by
replicating and extending these studies using different datasets and research design, thus
providing differentiated replication.
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Based on a sample of 48,414 firm-year observations for the period 2004 – 2014, I
first examined the relation between the issuance of a GCMO and the change in audit and
NAS fees. My results indicated that there was a significant relation between the issuance
of a first-time GCMO and audit fees. Contrary to expectations however, a negative
relation between the issuance of a GCMO and the change in audit fees was found
indicating that these distressed firms actually incurred lower audit fees after receiving a
GCMO. No significant relationship was found between the issuance of a first-time
GCMO and the change in NAS fees.
I then examined the relation between the issuance of a GCMO and auditor
dismissals. Consistent with prior literature, a positive relationship was found between a
first-time GCMO and auditor dismissal. Next, I examined the relation between auditor
dismissals and the change in audit and NAS fees. A significant negative relationship was
found between auditor dismissals and the change in both audit and NAS fees
As noted above, assuming the accuracy of a first-time GCMO, firms receiving a
GCMO are experiencing significant financial distress and if changing auditors is not a
costless event, the question as to what effect a change in auditor has on subsequent fees
(both audit and NAS) after the issuance of a GCMO is an important one to be addressed.
Therefore, my next analysis examined the effect on audit and NAS fees when a company
dismisses their auditor after the issuance of a GCMO in an attempt to provide evidence
on why companies may take such action. To examine these research questions, I used
regression analysis with either the change in audit or NAS fees as the dependent variable
with dummy variables for GCMO, auditor dismissal and an interaction term between
GCMO and auditor dismissal as explanatory variables. While a significant negative
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relationship was found between auditor dismissal and the change in both audit and NAS
fees, that relationship was no longer significant when a GCMO was present suggesting
that firms who dismiss their auditors after a first-time GCMO do not experience
decreases in either audit fees or NAS fees.
My final analysis investigated other potential explanations of why companies
purchase additional NAS after the issuance of a GCMO – the potential explanations
included compensating the auditor for additional risk due to the GCMO, compensating
the auditor for lowballing their audit fees and compensating the new auditor in order to
receive a more favorable opinion. I provide evidence that NAS were not purchased to
compensate auditors for any additional risk or to compensate the auditors for lowballing
and NAS were not purchased in order to receive a better audit opinion.
The topic of this dissertation is timely given recent developments. Historically,
identifying going concern issues have been the sole responsibility of the auditor and all of
the standards related to this issue have been in Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS). However, this is no longer the case. Going concern issues have recently
become a topic of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as well with the
issuance of the final version of the new standard, Presentation of Financial Statements –
Going Concern (Subtopic 205-40), in August 2014. This new standard affects GAAP
and for the first time makes company management responsible for determining if their
company is having going concern issues. This is no longer just an audit issue. In
addition, Financial Executives International (FEI) discussed an issue in their daily report
as to the controversial situation that could occur between differences in management’s
perspective and the auditor’s perspective due to the accounting standard using a
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probability lens while the auditing standards use a substantial doubt lens (Orenstein,
2014).
This study has several implications for prior research as well as for auditors and
policy makers and provides evidence that may help to answer some of the questions that
prior literature has not sufficiently addressed. For example, prior literature indicated that
the primary reason firms receiving a going concern opinion seek to change auditors is to
receive a different opinion (i.e., opinion shopping) and this research has indicated that
opinion shopping simply does not work – companies tend to receive the same audit
opinion even after changing auditors (e.g., Chow & Rice, 1982; Krishnan & Stephens,
1995; Geiger, Raghunandan & Rama, 1998). If opinion shopping does not work, then
what would motivate a company to change auditors? The findings in this study indicate
when firms change auditors, audit fees generally decrease. However, when an auditor
change happens after the issuance of a first-time GCMO, both audit and NAS fees do not
exhibit decreases. Given the gap in the extant literature focusing on the rationale for why
firms switch auditors even when they do not receive a favorable opinion, and the recent
focus on going concern issues by the FASB, the results of this study provide a valuable
contribution to the academic literature, the profession, and regulators on this topic. My
findings suggest there are other reasons beyond simply fees or the search for a more
favorable opinion as to why firms with a first-time GCMO change auditors that future
research can address. For example, these firms may switch auditors to obtain a higher
level of service from their auditor, to send a signal to the market and/or they may make
the switch to access NAS services to turn the company around (Williams, 1988;
Whisenant, 2003). A deeper dive into the qualitative information provided by
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management in their annual reports on how the company is working their way through
the GCMO situation, including their choice of outside professionals, might be in order.
The study also has practical implications by providing insight into the financial
cost of changing auditors if the firm has received a GCMO by extending the current
research to examine alternative explanations for opinion shopping by altering the design
of prior studies such as examining how fees change when a company who received a
going concern opinion changes auditors and how the audit opinion changes with the new
auditor given the change in fees. This study also has implications for policy makers. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) specifically defines the types of NAS public accounting firms
are not allowed to provide to their audit clients. The results in this study do not indicate
any relation between opinion shopping and NAS, thereby signaling that additional
limitations on the types of services public accountants provide may not be necessary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the
existing literature related to audit/NAS fees, auditor dismissals and the issuance of
GCMOs and the development of my research hypotheses. Chapter 3 then discusses the
sample selection process, the data sources used and the empirical models and variables
chosen to test the hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the results from my empirical tests.
Chapter 5 then summarizes these results and addresses potential limitations as well as the
overall contributions made by this study.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has had a profound impact on
audit and NAS fees over the past decade. The research to date has been extensive
regarding the impact of this legislation on both direct audit work specific to SOX (e.g.,
Section 404 work) and the overall increase in audit work needing to be performed.
However, there has been no research that specifically examined the fee effect on firms
that change auditors after the issuance of a GCMO in the post-SOX period.
A GCMO is issued to companies when the auditor has substantial doubt about the
company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Some of the indicators of substantial
doubt could include recurring operating losses, defaulting on loan repayment, labor
difficulties, legal proceedings, loss of a patent or other intellectual property, or even a
natural catastrophe (FASB, 2014). Assuming the accuracy of a first-time GCMO, when a
company receives a GCMO, they are experiencing financial distress. Receiving this type
of audit opinion could have an additional financial impact on the company in the form of
decreased borrowing ability, substantial loss of business or even the self-fulfilling
prophecy of bankruptcy (Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Geiger, Raghunandan, & Rama,
1998). The discussion that follows first details some of the basic research on the
determinants of audit and NAS fees and then specifically the impact on audit and NAS
fees when a GCMO is issued; the impact of a GCMO being issued on auditor dismissals;
the impact of changing auditors on both audit and NAS fees; and other potential
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explanations of why companies purchase additional NAS after the issuance of a going
concern opinion.
2.1 Determinants of audit and NAS fees
Audit fees
A considerable amount of research has been done to identify the determinants
related to audit fees. One area of research that has received significant attention relates to
internal controls – specifically the relation between internal control deficiencies and audit
fees. Other determinants that have been identified by prior research include the
probability of bankruptcy, firm size, managerial turnover and financial restatements.
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) examined the effect SOX Section 404 disclosures
had on audit fees. Their sample was taken from firms that filed their Section 404 reports
by May 15, 2005. In order to control for industry effects on audit fees, the authors
limited their sample to the manufacturing industry and then analyzed the increase in audit
fees from 2003 to 2004. They found that median audit fees increased 128% from 2003 to
2004. For firms that reported an internal control weakness in their report, their audit fees
were 43% higher than those firms without a reported internal control weakness.
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) examined the types of risks (inherent, control, and
detection) that affect overall audit risk which in turn drives audit fees due to the
additional substantive testing necessary to detect those risks. The authors examined the
period from November 2003 to November 2004 and found that audit fees were 35%
higher for firms that disclosed internal control deficiencies compared to those that did not
have any internal control deficiency disclosures. They further found that as these
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disclosed internal control deficiencies increased in severity, audit fees increased
indicating that auditors expended more effort due to the presence of these deficiencies.
Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard (2008) also found that there was an increase in audit
fees as material internal control weaknesses were disclosed. However, when observing
the effect of significant deficiencies, there was no statistically significant association with
audit fees. This study examined the period from November 2004 to October 2005. The
authors also addressed the type of internal control problem (general vs. account-specific).
For general internal control issues, there was an association of higher fees related to
disclosure, the control environment, and human resource related problems. For accountspecific control issues, higher fees were associated with problems related to revenue
recognition, accruals, and leases. Munsif, Raghunandan, Rama, and Singhvi (2011)
examined audit fees in companies who remediated their internal control weaknesses from
2004 to 2008. Once the company corrected the weaknesses, their audit fees were lower
than the firms who continued to have weaknesses, however, these companies continued
to have higher fees than those companies who never reported any weaknesses. Over the
following two years, these fees continued to decrease, but still were higher than those
companies without reported weaknesses indicating that there was a perceived risk
associated with previous internal control weaknesses.
Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song (2011) examined the effect of the updated auditing
standard on internal control weaknesses. Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) was
implemented to increase the efficiency of auditing internal control weaknesses, as
opposed to Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2), which caused over-auditing which
subsequently led to higher audit fees. This study examined the period from 2006 to 2008
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– the last year under AS2 and the first two years under AS5. The results showed a
statistically significant decline in audit fees in the first year of implementation of AS5.
There was not a statistically significant decline in year two of AS5. The firms that had a
material internal control weakness under AS5, but not under AS2, paid a fee premium of
15% over those firms that did not have a weakness, as opposed to firms under AS2, who
paid a 42% fee premium over firms without a weakness. Wang and Zhou (2012)
examined how AS5 affected audit fees from 2006 to 2008 while maintaining a quality
audit as measured by abnormal accruals and the probability of meeting or exceeding
analysts’ forecasts. The findings in their study confirmed, as did the others above, that
audit fees did decline after implementing AS5 while not reducing audit quality.
Dickens, Higgs and Skantz (2008) took a different approach in determining how
audit fees are priced post-SOX. Using a qualitative approach, they interviewed 27
partners and senior managers from different firms in different cities during the summer of
2006. As with audit fee pricing before SOX, there were three primary factors identified –
estimated time needed to perform the audit, personnel and skill level required to perform
the audit, and perceived risk and rewards of performing the audit. The findings in this
study indicated that after SOX, firms simply did not accept the work if the risk was too
high. Specifically, sixty-seven variables were identified which contributed to audit
pricing. Of those, the most important variable (based on mean) was the number of
material weaknesses identified in internal controls followed by perceived risk of
bankruptcy. These findings are consistent with several of the archival studies discussed
below (e.g., Desir, Casterella, & Kokina, 2014; Munsif et al., 2011; Sankaraguruswamy,
Whisenant, & Willenborg, 2012; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, & Raghunandan,
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2003). The two least important variables identified in this study were the company’s
return on assets and the company’s ratio of book value to market value. These findings
are not consistent with the archival studies discussed below – book to market value and
return on assets were significantly related to audit fees in several studies (e.g., Ashbaugh,
LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Huang, Parker, Yan, & Lin, 2014; Raghunandan & Rama,
2006; Whisenant et al., 2003).
Other studies examined the role of accounting firm size and managerial turnover.
Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) found post-SOX that audit fees increased in general from
2006 to 2008 regardless of the size of the audit firm. The Big 4 audit premium was
compounded after SOX as the fees increased 42% more for Big 4 auditors than for nonBig 4 auditors. This study also found that the Big 4 no longer offered discounts on initial
audit engagements while smaller firms still continued to offer these discounts. Feldmann,
Read, and Abdolmohammadi (2009) examined whether financial restatements from 2003
to 2005 increased audit fees and if a company’s turnover in management moderated the
increase in audit fees. An increase in audit fees was positive and significant indicating
that there was an increase in audit fees for companies that had financial restatements.
Determining whether a change in management would moderate the increase in audit fees,
the authors examined the effect when there was a change in CEO and CFO. The findings
in this study indicated that a new CEO was not significant but a new CFO was negative
and highly significant. The authors concluded that restatement companies with a new
CFO had lower audit fees because organizational legitimacy had been restored thus
lowering the auditors’ assessment of risk.
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As detailed above, there has been a significant amount of research regarding the
effects of varying aspects of the audit on audit fees.5 However, to date, there has been
little research regarding the change in audit fees in subsequent years after a significant
event (such as the issuance of a GCMO).6
NAS fees
NAS fees have long been a topic of controversy and have been under scrutiny due
to their perceived negative impact on auditor independence. However, some have argued
that NAS fees also have a positive effect due to knowledge spillover (Knechel & Sharma,
2012). This term is defined as a type of insider information gained in the course of a
NAS engagement that allows the audit firm to provide a more efficient audit and/or a
better quality audit opinion. NAS are the services provided to clients in addition to the
performance of an audit. These can be in the form of tax compliance, tax consulting
services, and certain advisory services. In 2000, the SEC required the amount of NAS
fees paid to a firm’s auditor to be disclosed (SEC, 2000). In 2002, SOX reduced the
number of NAS that the audit firm could provide. The main intent of SOX was to
prevent an auditor from providing services that would impair or give the impression of an
impairment of their independence. These primarily include providing bookkeeping
services and management type services.7 Prior studies have examined the relation
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6

7

Specific studies regarding how audit fees are affected by a GCMO are discussed in the GCMO research
section below.
Feldmann et al. (2009) and Ettredge et al. (2007) studied the change in audit fees, however, their
examinations were very narrow in scope. Feldmann examined the change in audit fees when financial
restatements occurred and Ettredge examined these fees in the pre-SOX versus post-SOX environment.
Both of these studies are discussed in more detail below.
SOX defines these types of services to include financial systems design and implementation; appraisal
or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit
outsourcing services; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser,
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between NAS fees and audit pricing, the knowledge spillover associated with providing
NAS, whether NAS fees impair auditor independence, the effect of financial restatements
on NAS fees and the effect of different audit committee characteristics on NAS fees.
Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and Raghunandan (2003) examined the timing of
the determination of audit and NAS fees in the year 2000. Previous studies used singleequations models, which estimated one of the fees with the other fee as an independent
variable and generally showed they were associated with one another. This study used a
simultaneous-equation model to determine if audit and NAS fees were determined
concurrently. Their findings did not support the hypothesis that NAS fees directly
influenced audit fees, however, the findings did reinforce the implication of the
simultaneous determination of audit and NAS fees.
Krishnan and Yu (2010) extended the study by Whisenant et al. (2003) by using a
simultaneous equation to determine if NAS fees were a predictor of audit fees and vice
versa where NAS fees was the dependent variable in one model and audit fees was the
dependent variable in another model. Whisenant et al. used a sample from just one year
(2000) while Krishnan and Yu used a sample over multiple years (2000 – 2006). The
authors found a negative significant relation between audit and NAS fees for both models
indicating that knowledge spillover occurred from audit to NAS and vice versa. Krishnan
and Yu also found that significant determinants of NAS fees included audit fees, total
assets, number of segments, number of employees, inventory/receivables, initial audit,
Big 4, auditor tenure, foreign operations, return volatility, GCMO, probability of
bankruptcy, stock return, and new financing.

or investment banking services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and any other
service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible (Section 201, SOX 2002).
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Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy and Zhou (2006) examined the relation between
fees paid to auditors (both audit and NAS) and abnormal accruals. They used a sample
from the United Kingdom from 1994 through 2000 and the United States for 2000 due to
fee disclosure not being mandatory in the US until 2000. The authors found a positive
significant relation between NAS fees and abnormal accruals indicating that NAS fees
were higher when abnormal accruals increased. Significant variables used to determine
NAS fees included abnormal accruals, audit fees, beginning total assets, inventory,
income taxes, and if the company had experienced a loss.
Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant (2003) studied firms that restated their
financial statements and whether these firms paid higher NAS fees. In comparing firms
that restated their financial statements before June 30, 2002 for fiscal years 2000 and
2001 to a control sample of non-restating firms for the same time period, the authors
found no significant difference in the amount of NAS and total fees paid.
Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) examined the impact of SOX on fees paid to
auditors including NAS fees from 2000-2005. The average NAS fees paid for the preSOX sample period was $1,259,634 and decreased to $671,364 for the post-SOX sample
period. The reduction in NAS fees was experienced more by Big 4 auditors, but non-Big
4 auditors also experienced a decline. The significant control variables used to determine
NAS fees were auditor type, total assets, ratio of current assets to total assets, current
ratio, ratio of inventory to total assets, ratio of receivables to total assets, profitability,
operating loss, merger activity, number of segments, and the ratio of foreign sales to total
sales. When the authors restricted the sample to observations that contained data for all
six years, whether the opinion was unqualified or not became significant and positive.
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Although there has been research on the determinants of NAS fees, there has been little
research regarding the change in NAS fees in subsequent years after a significant event
such as the issuance of a GCMO, which is consistent with the research on the
determinants of audit fees discussed above.
2.2 The impact of GCMOs on audit and NAS fees
There has been a significant amount of research on the impact of the issuance of a
GCMO on audit fees. Studies have examined the effect of a GCMO and auditor
dismissals and resignations on audit fees. There have also been studies related to the
effect of internal control weaknesses on audit fees when a GCMO is issued. In addition,
the effect of SOX on this relation has been examined as well as the type of audit firm
involved in the change (i.e., Big-N and Non Big-N). However, there has been virtually
no research on the impact of the issuance of a GCMO on NAS fees. As noted in the first
chapter, a few prior NAS fee studies included GCMO as a control variable, but none of
these studies did any detailed analysis related to the issuance of a GCMO.
In the post-SOX environment, the auditor is not permitted to perform many NAS.
There are new legal requirements for appointing an auditor, which now falls under the
purview of the audit committee (AC). The scope and fees paid to the auditor for audit
services must be pre-approved by the AC as well as NAS fees if they comprise more than
5% of total fees paid to the auditor. In addition to other legal requirements imposed by
SOX and litigation risk facing executives, directors and auditors, the results of prior
studies in the pre-SOX period may not be generalizable or hold in the post-SOX period.
Due to the unprecedented changes in the governance of the audit environment, it is
imperative to re-examine findings in pre-SOX studies. There are many studies that re-
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examine pre-SOX findings in other areas of auditing research and the results observed are
both conflicting and consistent, depending on the issue. In addition, the concept of
differentiated replication has also been called for in recent studies (e.g., Carcello,
Hermanson & Ye; 2011; DeFond & Zhang, 2015). Differentiated replication provides
evidence that findings in previous studies are empirically generalizable by replicating
these studies using different datasets.
Munsif et al. (2011) studied the effect of remediating internal control weaknesses
on audit fees from 2004 to 2008. This study found a positive relation between the
issuance of a GCMO and audit fees. Raghunandan and Rama (2006) examined the
impact on audit fees of internal control weaknesses identified in 2003 and 2004 in the
manufacturing industry. The results of this study did not indicate a significant relation
between GCMOs and fees in 2003, but did find a positive significant relation in 2004.
The authors indicated that this mixed result could be due to larger risk premiums related
to a distressed company or additional audit work that may be necessary due to a company
being under financial distress.
Sankaraguruswamy, Whisenant, and Willenborg (2012) studied companies who
changed auditors from one Big-N firm to another between 2000 and 2007. This study
examined the effect of several different variables on audit fees over three-year time
horizons. The issuance of a GCMO was only significantly positively related to audit fees
in two of these three-year periods – 2004-2006 and 2005-2007. Wang and Zhou (2012)
examined how the implementation of a new standard to increase the efficiency of
auditing internal control weaknesses (AS5) affected audit fees from 2006 to 2008. The
findings indicated that audit fees were significantly related to the issuance of a GCMO
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regardless of this new standard. However, Whisenant et al. (2003) did not find any
significant relations between the issuance of a GCMO and audit fees in the year 2000.
As indicated above, prior research has found that the issuance of a GCMO
generally has a positive impact on audit fees. However, these findings have been varied
and were dependent on the other determinants included in these respective studies as well
as the time periods being examined. An increase in audit fees could be related to a risk
premium the auditor will subsequently demand because the issuance of a GCMO
indicates the company is in financial distress. Additionally, the auditor would most likely
increase the scope of their audit work due to the corresponding increase in business risk
associated with the issuance of a GCMO. An increase in the scope of an audit generally
results in more audit work being necessary, which increases the amount of time needed to
perform the audit, which in turn increases overall audit fees.
Only one of the studies identified above (Whisenant et al., 2003) had the issuance
of a GCMO as a determinant of NAS fees and they did not find a significant relationship.
As noted above, when a company receives a first-time GCMO, it is a signal that the
company is in financial distress and therefore a riskier audit client. This increase in risk
could lead to an increase in audit fees and/or an increase in NAS fees to compensate the
auditor for engaging with a riskier client if the audit firm is looking at overall fees in
order to compensate for the corresponding increase in risk.
Another possible explanation could be that the company was trying to compensate
the auditor for low-balling their audit fees. In a competitive market, audit firms might
low-ball their audit fees in order to obtain a new client with the understanding that the
increased pressure these at-risk clients are under would result in the sale of more NAS in
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order to help the company recover from their distressed financial situation. Ciconte,
Knechel and Mayberry (2014) found that total NAS purchased with the audit positively
related to a subsequent increase in operating performance. This study also found that
firms that gained the most from the purchase of NAS were those firms with a high level
of “preexisting operating risk”.
It is also possible that an increase in NAS fees could simply be an attempt to bribe
the new auditor for a clean opinion. Once again, if the competition in the market limits
what can be charged for the audit, the client may attempt to make up the difference by
purchasing additional NAS. On the contrary, it is also possible that given the financial
distress of the company in a GCMO situation, the company may simply seek out ways to
cut costs including reducing some of their NAS.
Therefore, the impact of issuing a GCMO on audit and NAS fees is still a
question with mixed results depending on the time period of the study as well as the
sample population. As risk assessment appears to factor into auditors’ client acceptance
and retention decisions, and the issuance of a GCMO is an indicator of increased risk,
risk-based theory would indicate that an increase in risk should have a corresponding
increase in audit fees (Landsman, Nelson, & Rountree, 2009). As noted above, the extent
of the change in audit and NAS fees and the nature of the fees involved has had mixed
results but generally, the relation with audit fees has been positive (e.g., Ettredge et al.,
2007; Desir et al., 2014; Huang, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2009) while the finding
regarding the relation with NAS fees have not been conclusive in the extant literature.
An increase in NAS fees could be observed if a firm compensates the auditor through
NAS fees for taking on a risky client, to compensate for low-balling the audit fee and/or

21
to simply bribe the auditor for a clean opinion. Alternatively, due to the financial distress
that caused the GCMO in the first place, the company may seek out ways to cut other
costs including reducing some of their NAS. My ex-ante expectation was that there was
a relationship between the issuance of a first time GCMO and NAS fees, but given the
conflicting explanations of why this relationship exists, I did not predict a direction.
Therefore, the first set of hypotheses is as follows (see Figure 1):
H1a:

There is a positive relation between the issuance of a first-time
GCMO and the change in audit fees.

H1b: There is a relation between the issuance of a first-time GCMO and
the change in NAS fees.

2.3 The impact of GCMOs on auditor dismissals
There has been an extensive amount of research on the determinants of changing
auditors. This research has focused on many different areas including: opinion shopping;
auditor resignations; internal control weaknesses; stressed companies, companies with
financial restatements; audit committee composition and size of the audit firm. Many of
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these studies included the issuance of a GCMO in their models. Prior literature has
indicated that the primary reason firms receiving a GCMO seek to change auditors is to
receive a different opinion (i.e., opinion shopping).
In their seminal work, Chow and Rice (1982) addressed how the issuance of a
qualified opinion in 1973-74 affected a change in auditor, i.e., auditor switching. The
basic question was does opinion shopping work? In trying to determine why firms switch
auditors, the only variable that was statistically significant in this study was the type of
opinion received before changing auditor. For opinion shopping, the authors compared
the opinion received in the following year for firms that received a qualified opinion and
switched auditors. The results were not significant, suggesting that changing auditors did
not improve the type of opinion received from the old auditor. Krishnan and Stephens
(1995) extended prior studies on opinion shopping by observing data on companies who
switched auditors for two years (1986-87 and 1987-88) as compared to previous studies
which only examined the year prior to switching. This study hypothesized that clients
who switched received more favorable treatment from their successor auditors when
compared to their former auditors. Their findings indicated that predecessor and
successor auditors did not treat a client differently and issued a similar opinion, which
was contrary to their expectations. They further stated that clients who changed auditors
for reasons other than opinion shopping, such as enhancing the credibility of the financial
statements, may be penalized through the issuance of public policy statements that were
designed to control opinion shopping.
DeFond, Ettredge, and Smith (1997) examined the propensity of receiving a
GCMO if the auditor resigned versus being dismissed from 1982 to 1987. This study
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found that companies tended to receive a GCMO prior to the resignation of their auditor.
The auditor resignation may have occurred due to a perceived increase in risk related to
auditor-client disagreements reported on Form 8-K and/or a negative change in cash
flows from operations.
In a study to examine the costs associated with going-concern audit opinions,
Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (1998) assessed both the cost to the auditor and the cost
to the client of the issuance of a GCMO. The authors addressed whether companies that
received a going-concern modified opinion in 1990 or 1991 were equally likely to switch
auditors as stressed companies that did not receive a GCMO. They found that the only
significant variable in explaining why companies change auditors was the receipt of a
going-concern modified opinion. They also addressed whether companies that received a
first-time going-concern modified opinion and switched auditors were equally likely to
receive a subsequent going-concern modified opinion as those who did not switch
auditors. Their findings indicated that changing auditors did not appear to have a
significant effect in explaining subsequent audit opinions and therefore concluded,
similar to prior research, that attempts to opinion shop were unsuccessful.
Davidson III, Jiraporn, and DaDalt (2006) examined whether companies that
switch auditors after receiving a modified audit opinion were more likely to choose a
non-Big six auditor than those companies that received unqualified audit opinions. This
study examined auditor changes from 1993 to 1997. The results in this study indicated
that when a company received a modified audit opinion and switched to a new auditor,
they were more likely to switch to a non-Big six auditor regardless of whether the prior
auditor was a Big six or non-Big six firm. The authors suggested that the non-Big six
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firm was considered a lower quality auditor and could be perceived as a less strict
auditor.
In a different view on the costs of going-concern modified opinions, Carey,
Geiger and O’Connell (2008) examined Australian firms from 1994 to 1997 and
addressed the financial cost to the auditor for issuing a first time GCMO. They found
companies receiving first-time GCMOs were more likely to switch auditors than
similarly stressed companies not receiving a GCMO. The authors’ findings were positive
and significant, indicating that if a company received a first-time GCMO, they were more
likely to switch audit firms when compared to similar highly stressed companies who did
not receive a GCMO. This study also found that the audit fees paid in the subsequent
year were significantly greater for the companies that received a GCMO than for those
companies that were in similar distress but did not receive a GCMO. This confirmed the
hypothesis that the audit fee revenue lost was greater for companies that received
GCMOs than for those companies that did not receive GCMOs. However, they did not
take into account the audit fee revenue that would be gained from a new client to see if
the net effect on total audit fees was significant. Their data source was sixty Australian
companies that received a going-concern modified opinion plus matched pairs. Due to
the limited size of the sample, testing the data by specific audit firms may have rendered
the sample too small.
As noted above, the extant research has generally indicated a positive relation
between the issuance of a GCMO and a subsequent change in auditor. Prior research has
indicated that a major motivation for such a change is that the company believed they
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would get a “fairer shake” in the form of a clean opinion by a new auditor – i.e., opinion
shopping.
Governance changes post-SOX have put strict limitations on how, when and why
a firm can change auditors. SOX is explicit in requiring that firms cannot change or
dismiss their auditor without the audit committee’s involvement and approval. SOX has
also changed the audit landscape by requiring the audit committee to have direct
responsibility for the management of the outside auditors. The task of appointing,
compensating, retaining, and work oversight of the external audit firm is now the direct
responsibility of the audit committee. This is an important shift in the outside auditor’s
line of reporting to the company’s management thereby increasing the independent nature
of the auditor’s scope of work. These SOX driven changes suggest that findings from
previous studies based on pre-SOX data may not be generalizable to the post-SOX
period. In addition, there is strong evidence showing the nature of the audit and NAS
provision has changed dramatically in the post-SOX period (Huang et al., 2009; Knechel
& Sharma, 2012; Desir et al., 2014). Thus, examining whether firms receiving a GCMO
would change auditors in the post-SOX period becomes an interesting question. Since
this study in many ways reexamined findings of prior studies, the essence here was a
differentiated replication in a different time period where governance regulations are
drastically different. In keeping with the general conclusion from the prior literature, the
second hypothesis is as follows: (see Figure 2):
H2:

There is a positive relation between the issuance of a first-time
GCMO and an auditor dismissal.8

8

Since I am examining whether the issuance of a GCMO affects the company’s decision to change
auditors, my sample includes only the auditor changes that were the result of auditor dismissals.
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2.4 The impact of auditor dismissals on audit and NAS fees
The first set of hypotheses examined the change in audit and NAS fees related to
the issuance of a GCMO while the second hypothesis examined the impact of the
issuance of a GCMO on dismissals. The next step was to review the literature that
examines the relation between auditor dismissals and audit and NAS fees – the third side
of this triangular relation as shown in Figure 3 below.
The overall impact of auditor change on the audit process and audit/NAS fees has
been an area of study for many years as well. Once again, the research can be broken
down between pre-SOX and post-SOX changes as well as changes that occur after events
such as the issuance of a GCMO, which is the primary focus of this study. The following
is a summary of the research on the factors associated with auditor changes, how auditor
changes affect audit fees and how auditor changes affect NAS fees.
The relation between changing auditors and audit fees
Eichenseher and Shields (1983) researched variables that affected the change in
the relation between the auditor and the client. A survey was circulated to companies that
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had auditor changes from 1976 to 1977. The two most important variables identified in
this survey were audit fees and working relationship. Technical qualifications and audit
team experience were not significant. This was consistent regardless of audit firm size or
client size. Simon and Francis (1988) examined the price cutting phenomena for
companies who changed auditors from 1979 to 1984. They found an average decrease of
24% in audit fees in the first year and an average decrease of 15% in fees over the next
two years. After the third year, a discount was not observed indicating that audit fees had
returned to pre-auditor change levels. These results were consistent regardless of the size
of the audit firm.
Ettredge and Greenberg (1990) identified a decline in the initial mean and median
audit fees charged when a firm changed auditors of 25% and 23% respectively. This
study examined auditor changes from 1984 to 1987. The authors extended previous
literature by examining the expertise of the auditors and the number of auditors bidding
on the engagement. The authors hypothesized that changing to an auditor with industry
expertise aligned with the industry of the firm would result in efficiencies. They used
two measures of industry expertise, sales-weighted market share and firms who were
cited as experts by client management. This study found a statistically significant
decrease in audit fees as the market share expertise of the firm increased suggesting that
auditors with more market share passed at least some of the economies of scale they
realized from that increased market share onto their clients. However, audit fees did
increase as management’s perception of the auditor’s industry expertise increased,
suggesting management was willing to pay a premium for the expertise provided by the
auditor. The authors also found that as the number of bidders for the engagement
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increased (i.e., the market became more competitive), the audit fee declined by an
average of one percent per bidder.
Butterworth and Houghton (1995) examined auditor changes in Australia from
1987 to 1988 and the effect on audit fees. Using the full population of all public
companies in the Western Australian region with available information, this study did not
observe any type of price-cutting. Craswell and Francis (1999) compared two theories of
pricing initial audit engagements with Australian companies and auditing firms in 1987.
One model predicted that there would be a discount for all initial audit engagements
while the other model predicted that a discount would not be realized in all initial audit
engagements when audit fees were publicly disclosed. The authors first used their audit
fee model for all companies regardless of whether the change in auditor was to a Big 8 or
not. Then the authors added an indicator variable on the type of auditor change: within
Big 8, within non-Big 8, change from non-Big 8 to Big 8, and change from Big 8 to nonBig 8. The authors found that there was only a statistically significant discount on audit
fees when there was a change from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditor. The authors suggested
that the cause of this discount was due to the economic concept of experienced goods,
which asserts that a discount on higher-priced goods is used to induce purchasing these
goods to entice the company to experience the goods.
Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2012) extended the research by Craswell and Francis
after the SEC required disclosure of audit fees for U.S. audits. The authors examined
U.S. companies who received an audit from Big N audit firms in multiple three-year
segments between 2000 and 2007. The first year used in this sequence could not be their
initial year with a Big N audit firm. For the second year, the sample was split into two
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sub-groups by either switching to another Big N firm or staying with their incumbent
firm. This allowed for a comparison of audit fees for companies that switched audit firms
to companies that did not switch. In the third year, companies were to remain with the
same audit firm as in year two. This allowed for an examination of the change in audit
fees from year two to year three. The authors found that for all years of initial audits
when there was a change in auditor, there was a decrease in audit fees especially in 2001
and 2006. In the second year after a change in auditor, an increase in audit fees was
reported to almost pre-change audit fee levels.
Ettredge, Li and Scholz (2007) examined auditor changes post-SOX (specifically
auditor dismissals in 2004). Prior literature indicated audit fees increased after SOX due
to an increase in audit procedures. This study found that auditor changes were associated
with increased fees, smaller companies, and the receipt of a GCMO. The findings also
indicated an association between higher fees and switching to non-Big 4 auditors and
were consistent with prior literature where companies switching auditors after having
previously received a GCMO received the same opinion after the switch (Chow & Rice,
1982; Geiger et al., 1998). Although fees increased significantly for all companies in this
study, the magnitude of the fee increases were not as large for those companies that
changed auditors. In addition, those companies that changed to non-Big 4 auditors had
smaller fee increases than those companies that switched to another Big 4 firm.
In the post-SOX era, a substantial amount of research in the area of auditor
change has focused on how additional audit work, the reduction in the number of audit
firms and financial restatements have effected audit fees when the change occurs.
Asthana, Balsam and Kim (2009) examined the change in audit fees in the post-Enron

30
era, how the forced change of auditor affected Arthur Andersen’s clients, and whether
riskier clients had higher audit fees. In examining the change in audit fees from 2000 to
2002, audit fees did not significantly change in the first year but did have a positive
increase during 2002, which corresponds with the period of reduced service providers.
However, when segmenting the sample and observing the change in audit fees for firms
who switched auditors and whether the client was switching from Andersen to another
Big 4 firm or a non-Big 4 firm, the results were mixed. The increase in fees for Andersen
clients who switched to other Big 4 firms was not as great as the fee increase for clients
who were not from Andersen, indicating that there was competition between the
remaining firms for the Andersen clients (i.e., low-balling). When examining risk
factors, including standard financial ratios and previous audit opinions, if the client
became more risky, their audit fees increased in 2002.
Ebrahim (2010) found that there was an increase in audit fees during 2004-2005
due to SOX implementation, but for 2006, the audit fee increases slowed down. The
study also showed a trend of switching from Big 4 to non-Big 4 firms with a lower
increase in audit fees. Griffin and Lont (2005) examined the impact on audit fees due to
auditor dismissals and resignations from 2000 to 2004. For dismissals, it was found that
fees were discounted by both the successor auditor in the year after the change and the
incumbent auditor the year before the change. The authors concluded from these findings
that simply the threat of a dismissal may influence fees. However, for resignations it was
found that fees were higher both before and after the auditor change indicating that
auditors charge a premium when a resignation occurs. The study suggested that this was
potentially due to the new auditor assuming greater than normal litigation risk and/or
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perceiving an increase in audit effort. The findings in this study indicated that while SOX
did not affect the discounting of fees around a dismissal, it did result in a higher fee
premium when a resignation occurred. This study also found a positive relation between
audit fees and the issuance of a GCMO for both types of auditor change.
Elliott, Ghosh, and Peltier (2013) examined the relation between audit fees and
risky initial audit engagements. The authors studied auditor-client disagreements and
reportable events as reported in their 8-K from 2004 to 2011 as a measure of risk. The
findings indicated that auditors increased fees as clients developed problems. When a
client changed auditors after disagreements or a reportable event, audit fees were 45%
higher if the new auditor was a Big 4 auditor. This fee premium continued for at least
three years after the change. Huang, Raghunandan, and Rama (2009) found that after
SOX, the initial audit discount (known as low-balling) was gone. The authors examined
auditor changes in 2001 and 2006. Consistent with prior literature, in 2001 the new
auditor charged 24% less for the initial audit. However, in 2006, Big 4 auditors charged
an average fee premium of 16% to new clients. They also noted that if there was a
change in auditor, the Big 4 firm was not retained. Desir, Casterella, and Kokina (2014)
examined the discounting of audit fees for initial engagements to determine if the audit
fee premium still existed after the implementation of SOX. Their sample years were
2007 to 2010 – extending Huang et al.’s (2009) final sample year of 2006. Their results
showed that discounting audit fees had resurfaced in these subsequent years. All the
sample years indicated discounting for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms.
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The relation between changing auditors and NAS fees
As noted above, there have been several studies that examined the determinants of
NAS fees. However, only two studies have been identified that examined the relation
between auditor changes and NAS fees. DeBerg, Kaplan, and Pany (1991) addressed
changing auditors and NAS fees. Comparing companies that changed auditors to those
that did not change from 1978 to 1982, this study found that there was not a significant
difference in NAS fees purchased by the companies prior to the change. However, for
those companies that did change auditors, there was a significant decline in the NAS fees
purchased from the predecessor auditor in the year following the change (this study only
examined the first year after the change). Using audit and NAS fee data from the U.K
from 1994 to 2000, Antle et al. (2006) found knowledge spillover from both audit
services to NAS and from NAS to audit services. Auditor change was one of the control
variables in this study; however, the results did not indicate a significant relation between
auditor change and NAS fees.
In summary, there has been a significant amount of research documenting the
relation between a change in auditor and audit fees. However, the nature of this relation
has had mixed results across the studies reviewed depending on the circumstances
surrounding the change (e.g., forced or voluntary change, riskiness of the engagement,
change in audit firm size – Big N to non-Big N or vice versa, etc.). Conversely, there has
been little research on the relation between a change in auditor and NAS fees and the
findings in these studies have not been conclusive. Using the risk-based theories
discussed above, one would expect a positive relation between auditor dismissal and
audit fees. However, if one considers the low-balling theory discussed above, this
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relation between auditor dismissal and audit fees would likely be negative. Since NAS
fees are typically lower in the first few years of an auditor’s tenure (Ghosh, Kallapur, &
Moon, 2006), the relation with NAS fees should be negative. However, NAS fees could
increase if a firm compensates the new auditor for taking on a risky client, compensates
the new auditor for any low-balling of audit fees, and/or uses it to bribe the new auditor
for a clean opinion. As mentioned earlier, due to the unprecedented changes in the
governance of the audit environment, it is important to re-examine findings in pre-SOX
studies. Therefore, depending on the variables being studied, the different theories being
discussed and the time period of the study, I propose the following hypotheses in order to
examine these relations in the post-SOX time period (see Figure 3):
H3a:

There is a relation between an auditor dismissal and the change in
audit fees.

H3b: There is a relation between an auditor dismissal and the change in
NAS fees.
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As outlined above, this study examined three distinct relations: the effect
of issuing a first-time GCMO on the change in audit and NAS fees (H1); the
relation between the issuance of a first-time GCMO and auditor dismissal (H2);
and the effect of an auditor dismissal on the change in audit and NAS fees (H3).
Several studies have examined these different relations with mixed results.
However, no study has addressed the extent to which the issuance of a first-time
GCMO moderates the relation between a change in auditor and the change in fees
– i.e., what is the impact on audit and NAS fees when there is an auditor dismissal
after the issuance of a GCMO.
As was discussed earlier in this study, changing auditors is not a costless
event and if a company is facing the issuance of a first-time GCMO, the company
is obviously under some level of financial distress. The reasons for changing
auditors have not been clearly identified in the extant literature. Two alternatives
that have been thoroughly examined include companies that might be searching
for a lower cost alternative or companies that are unhappy with their current
opinion and go searching for a more favorable opinion. As identified in numerous
studies (e.g., Chow & Rice, 1982; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Krishnan &
Stephens, 1995), opinion shopping does not seem to result in a different opinion.
Therefore, a decrease in fees may be the motivation behind the change in auditor.
A positive relation might exist if the company that is issued a GCMO is
now perceived as more risky and therefore in need of additional audit procedures
and/or auditors may charge higher audit fees to compensate for the riskiness of
the client. A negative relation might exist if, when changing auditors after a
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GCMO, the subsequent auditor “lowballs” a bid in order to obtain the client. As
audit partners are compensated for the number and size of their clients (Knechel,
Niemi, & Zerni, 2013), there are individual incentives to obtain or retain clients.
Chakrabarty, Duellman, and Hyman (2015) examined the relation between
financial statement fraud and audit fees from 2000 to 2013 and found that as the
likelihood of fraud increased, audit fees decreased. The authors postulated that
the auditors were willing to decrease fees as the likelihood of fraud increased
indicating that client retention was more important than the risk to their reputation
for not detecting the fraud. In addition, Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree (2009)
examined auditor switches in both the pre- and post-Enron era (specifically from
1993 to 2000 and then from 2003 to 2005) and found that smaller audit firms are
more likely to engage with riskier clients because the increase in revenue
associated with the new client is more likely to exceed the increase in cost
associated with that client.
The direction of the relation is also not known when it comes to NAS fees.
It could be that with an auditor dismissal, the company does not immediately seek
NAS from their new auditor, which would result in a decrease in NAS fees.
However, it is also possible that an increase in NAS fees could result if the
company is trying to compensate the new auditor for engaging with a more risky
client. As noted above, if the audit environment is competitive, the audit fee
might not be as negotiable and therefore, the company might compensate the
auditor for this increase in risk by purchasing additional NAS. It is also possible
that the client purchases additional NAS in order to improve their operating
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performance (Ciconte, Knechel & Mayberry, 2014). Finally, as noted above, the
company could simply be attempting to bribe the auditor for a clean opinion with
the purchase of additional NAS.9
Therefore, it remains an open question that if a company receives a firsttime GCMO and subsequently dismisses the auditors, what is the impact on their
audit and NAS fees. This led me to the fourth set of hypotheses (see Figure 4):
H4a:

The existence of a first-time GCMO has a moderating effect on the
relation between an auditor dismissal and the change in audit fees.

H4b:

The existence of a first-time GCMO has a moderating effect on the
relation between an auditor dismissal and the change in NAS fees.

9

It is also possible that a company changes auditor in an attempt to correct their performance issues.
However, I will leave this question to future research.
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2.5 Potential reasons companies purchase NAS after a GCMO
As discussed earlier, there are many possible explanations for why a company
might buy additional NAS from a new audit firm after the issuance of a GCMO. Several
studies have examined the relation between NAS fees and the issuance of a GCMO (e.g.,
Sharma & Sidhu, 2001; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Callaghan,
Parkash, & Singhal, 2009; Blay & Geiger, 2013). However, no studies directly examined
why firms might purchase additional NAS after the issuance of a GCMO.
As noted above, it is clear that companies receiving a first-time GCMO are under
financial distress and are in need of some kind of change in their operating performance
if they are going to survive. Ciconte et al. (2014) examine whether the purchase of NAS
in conjunction with the audit provide value to a client by improving their operating
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performance and by improving how the client manages risk. This study found that the
purchase of NAS was positively related to subsequent increases in operating performance
and that NAS was negatively related to future operating risk indicating that NAS
enhances the company’s risk management. Although this study does not directly
examine the issuance of a GCMO, it can be argued that poor operating performance is
related to the possibility of a company receiving a GCMO. Prior literature has also
provided evidence that NAS purchases can be used to bribe the auditor. For instance,
Causholli, Chambers, and Payne (2014) provide evidence that future additional purchases
of NAS can lower current audit quality and that this finding is pronounced for firms with
a greater need to manage earnings. Once again, although this study does not directly
examine the issuance of a GCMO, it can be argued that a greater need to manage
earnings certainly exists in those firms receiving a GCMO.
I examined three basic explanations for why firms might purchase greater NAS
from their new auditor after receiving a first-time GCMO.10 One potential explanation
for buying additional services is that the company is trying to compensate the new auditor
for engaging with a more risky client. Another possible explanation is that the company
is trying to compensate the new auditor for low-balling their audit fees. Alternatively, it
simply could be an attempt to bribe the auditor for a clean opinion. These were just three
of the potential explanations and it should be noted that these are not mutually exclusive
– some or all of these explanations could contribute to why firms purchase NAS, which
led me to my final set of hypotheses:

10

Another potential explanation is that a company changes auditors in an attempt to turn around their poor
performance. However, I will leave this question to future research.
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H5a:

A company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases additional NAS from
their new auditor in order to compensate the auditor for engaging with a
more risky client.

H5b:

A company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases additional NAS from
their new auditor in order to compensate the auditor for lowballing their
audit fee (cross-subsidization hypothesis).

H5c:

A company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases additional NAS from
their new auditor in order to receive a better opinion.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
In order to analyze the relations between audit/NAS fees, auditor dismissals and
GCMOs, I obtained data for all U.S. publicly listed companies from 2004 to 2014.
Consistent with prior research (Munsif et al., 2011; Blay & Geiger, 2013; Desir et al.,
2014), the sample period begins in 2004 after the implementation of SOX. Financial
institutions and utility companies were also removed to be consistent with prior research
and because these industries are heavily regulated and have unique financial reporting
and auditing issues (Huang et al., 2009; Knechel & Sharma, 2012; Elliott, Ghosh, &
Peltier, 2013; Huang et al., 2014).
Audit Analytics was utilized to obtain the independent and dependent variables
including audit and NAS fees, auditor dismissal and the moderator variable – type of
opinion issued. Compustat was used for the majority of the financial control variables.
Zmijewski’s ZScore was used as a measure of financial distress and the information
necessary for that computation was also obtained from Compustat (Zmijewski, 1984).
Panel A of Table 1 details the sample selection process. The sample selection
began with all firm-years with audit fees in Audit Analytics from 2004 through 2014 for
a total of 128,034 observations. I excluded 59,135 firm years that were missing in
Compustat. Financial institutions and utility companies for a total of 16,867 firm year
observations were also removed to be consistent with prior research and because these
industries are heavily regulated and have unique financial reporting and auditing issues
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(Huang et al., 2009; Knechel & Sharma, 2012; Elliott, Ghosh, & Peltier, 2013; Huang et
al., 2014). The sample was further reduced for missing data in Audit Analytics of 325
firm-year observations and 3,253 firm-year observations in Compustat. This left a final
sample of 48,414 firm-year observations. Panel B of Table 1 details the number of firm
year observations by year. The sample includes 4,983 firm years in 2004, 4,823 firmyears in 2005, 4,744 firm-years in 2006, 4,606 firm-years in 2007, 4,381 firm-years in
2008, 4,204 firm-years in 2009, 4,135 firm-years in 2010, 4,068 firm-years in 2011,
4,096 firm-years in 2012, 4,152 firm-years in 2013, and 4,222 firm-years in 2014.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the sample’s industry composition. Similar to previous
research, a two-digit SIC code was used (Huang et al., 2014). There are 62 individual
SIC codes in the sample. Manufacturing (SIC codes 20-39) represents approximately
50% of the sample.
Table 1
Sample Selection and Industry
Panel A: Sample Selection:
Initial firm-year observations with audit fees in Audit analytics
Less: Firm-year observations not in Compustat
Less: Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and Utilities (SIC 49004999)
Less: Firm-year observations with missing data in Audit Analytics
Less: Firm-year observations with missing data in Compustat
Total number of observations in final sample

Observations
128,034
(59,135)
(16,907)
(325)
(3,253)
48,414

Panel B: Sample by year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Firm-Years
4,983
4,823
4,744
4,606
4,381
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2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Final Sample

4,204
4,135
4,068
4,096
4,152
4,222
48,414

Panel C: Sample by Industry Composition:
Two-Digit
SIC Code
00-09
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-48
50-59
70-59
80-89
90-99

Industry Name
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing
Mining and construction
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Transportation and communications
Wholesale and retail trade
Services
Services
Public administration
Total Sample

Number
% of Sample
of Firms
210
0.43
4,295
8.87
9,914
20.48
14,576
30.11
3,698
7.64
4,594
9.49
8,035
16.60
2,300
4.75
792
1.64
48,414
100.00

3.2 Research Method and Measurement of Variables
Consistent with prior research on GCMOs, auditor dismissals and audit/NAS fees,
a multivariate regression model was used to examine the relations between GCMOs,
auditor dismissals and audit/NAS fees. These multivariate regression models helped me
test my five sets of hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1 posited that there was a positive relation between the issuance of a
first-time GCMO and the change in audit fees and a negative relation between the
issuance of a first-time GCMO and the change in NAS fees. In order to examine these
hypotheses, I tested two different models based on the different dependent variables. The
first model included the change in audit fees as the dependent variable, while the other
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model examined the change in NAS fees. In addition, given that the second hypothesis
posits that a significant association exists between auditor dismissal and GCMO, as well
as that a change in auditor is a choice, I used a two-stage treatment effects model
(Greene, 2003; Maddala, 1983). More specifically, I ran model 3 below as a multivariate
probit regression to obtain an inverse Mills ratio (MILLS) that was used in models that
included both auditor dismissal and GCMO as independent variables.11 The variable of
interest for Hypothesis 1 was the issuance of a GCMO. Therefore, the models for the
first set of hypotheses are as follows:
∆AUDIT FEES t =

β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 BIG 4t-1 + β4 SIZEt-1 +
β5 RESTATEt-1 + β6 SEGSt-1 + β7 FORSEGSt-1 + β8 BMt-1 + β9
RECINVt-1 + β10 MERGERt-1 + β11 ICMWt-1 + β12 LOSSt-1 +
β13 ROAt-1 + β14 ZSCOREt-1 + β15 LIQt-1 + β16 LEVt-1 + β17
NEWFINt-1 + β18 CEOTURNt-1 + β19 CFOTURNt-1 + β20 ARLt-1
+ β21 YEARt-1 + β22 INDUSt-1 + β23 MILLSt + ε
(1)

∆NAS FEES t =

β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 BIG 4t-1 + β4 SIZEt-1 +
β5 RESTATEt-1 + β6 SEGSt-1 + β7 FORSEGSt-1 + β8 BMt-1 + β9
RECINVt-1 + β10 MERGERt-1 + β11 ICMWt-1 + β12 LOSSt-1 +
β13 ROAt-1 + β14 ZSCOREt-1 + β15 LIQt-1 + β16 LEVt-1 + β17
NEWFINt-1 + β18 CEOTURNt-1 + β19 CFOTURNt-1 + β20 ARLt-1
+ β21 YEARt-1 + β22 INDUSt-1 + β23 MILLSt + ε
(2)

11

To implement this approach, a variable must be identified that is related to the dependent variable in the
first regression (i.e., auditor dismissal) but not related to the dependent variable in the second regression
(i.e., fees). A review of the literature suggests that auditor tenure meets this requirement (Hay et al., 2006).
Therefore, I included auditor tenure in the first stage multivariate probit regression (model 3).
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I formally define all independent and dependent variables used in my
models in the next section.
Hypothesis 2 posited that there was a positive relation between the
issuance of a first-time GCMO and an auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR).
Therefore, the variable of interest was also the issuance of a GCMO. However, in
this hypothesis, the dependent variable was auditor dismissal.12 As this was a
dichotomous variable, a multivariate logistic model was utilized. The control
variables in this model have the same definition as the variables in the other
models; however, the direction of the relation with the dependent variable in this
model may be different than the other models. In addition, there are several
variables from the other models that are not included in this model because either
they were not used in previous studies regarding auditor change or no significant
relations were found in previous studies between these variables and auditor
change. The model for Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
∆AUDITOR t =

β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 BIG 4t-1 + β3 SIZEt-1 + β4 RESTATEt-1 +
β5 SEGSt-1 + β6 RECINVt-1 + β7 MERGERt-1 + β8 LOSSt-1 + β9
ROAt-1 + β10 ZSCOREt-1 + β11 LEVt-1 + β12 ICMWt-1 + β13
TENUREt-1 + ε

(3)

Hypothesis 3 posited that there was a relation between an auditor dismissal and
change in audit/NAS fees. I used the same empirical models as H1 to test my third
hypothesis. The primary difference was that the variable of interest was auditor dismissal
(∆AUDITOR), not GCMO.

12

Consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter, I limited this analysis to only observations where
the auditor was dismissed.
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Hypothesis 4 posited that there was a change in the relation between an auditor
dismissal and the change in audit/NAS fees when there is the issuance of a first-time
GCMO. The models for Hypotheses 4 are similar to the models for the first and third
hypotheses, however an interaction term between a GCMO and auditor dismissal is
included.
∆AUDIT FEES t =

β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt-1*∆AUDITORt
+ β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8
FORSEGSt-1 + β9 BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 +
β12 ICMWt-1 + β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt-1 + β16
LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 + β19 CEOTURNt-1 + β20
CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22 YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24
MILLSt + ε

∆NAS FEES t =

(4)

β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt-1*∆AUDITORt
+ β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8
FORSEGSt-1 + β9 BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 +
β12 ICMWt-1 + β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt-1 + β16
LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 + β19 CEOTURNt-1 + β20
CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22 YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24
MILLSt + ε

(5)

Hypothesis 5 posited that there might be other potential reasons why a firm that
changes auditors after receiving a first-time GCMO would purchase additional NAS from
their new auditor. These alternatives included the potential explanation that buying
additional services could be a way for the firm to compensate the auditor for engaging
with a more risky client (H5a) which was tested by taking the sum of coefficients of β2
and β3 in model 5 above. More specifically, since GCMO proxies for the riskiness of the
client, β2 + β3 > 0 would be consistent with H5a.
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Another possible explanation discussed above could be that the company was
trying to compensate the auditor for low-balling their audit fees (H5b). Model 6 was
used to examine firms with a GCMO who switch auditors and if low-balling does exist,
test whether the audit firm was trying to recoup this loss in audit fees through higher
NAS fees (i.e., cross-subsidization). In order to test this low-balling hypothesis (H5b), I
used an alternative to model 5 where the dependent variable was the ratio of NAS fees to
audit fees and the coefficients of interest were again β2 and β3. β2 + β3 > 0 would be
consistent with H5b in the model below:
NAS FEES t / AUDIT FEES t = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt1*∆AUDITORt

+ β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6

RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8 FORSEGSt-1 + β9
BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 + β12
ICMWt-1 + β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt1

+ β16 LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 + β19

CEOTURNt-1 + β20 CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22
YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24 MILLSt + ε
(6)
The third potential explanation identified above was that these additional NAS
fees could simply be an attempt to bribe the auditor for a clean opinion. The model for
this last hypothesis (H5c) uses the issuance of a GCMO as the dependent variable with
NAS fees, auditor dismissal and the interaction of NAS fees and auditor dismissal as the
variables of interest. The control variables in this model have the same definition as the
variables in the other models, however, the direction of the relation with the dependent
variable in this model may be different than the other models. In addition, note that there
were several variables from the other models that were not included in this model
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because either they were not used in previous studies regarding GCMO and NAS fees or
no significant relations were found in previous studies between these variables. This
analysis only focuses on the subset of firms with a GCMO. Given how the dependent
variable was coded (i.e., 0 represents a clean opinion), β2 + β3 < 0 would be consistent
with H5c. In other words, if a firm purchases greater NAS fees then they are more likely
to get a clean opinion with a new auditor. This last model is as follows:
GCMOt = β0 + β1 NAS FEESt + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 NAS FEESt*∆AUDITORt +
β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 ZSCOREt-1 + β7 LIQt-1 + β8 LEVt-1 + β9
NEWFINt-1 + β10 ARLt-1 + ε
(7)
where GCMO takes a value of 1 if a GCMO was issued and 0 otherwise.
These are just three of the potential explanations and it should be noted that these
are not mutually exclusive – some or all of these explanations could contribute to why
firms purchase NAS.
3.2.1 Dependent Variables
Fees paid to auditors have been measured and dissected in several ways including
examining only audit fees paid and only NAS fees paid. Audit fees charged by auditors
are the result of various risk factors including GCMOs (Whisenant et al., 2003; Ettredge
et al., 2007; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Desir et al., 2014). Prior studies have
indicated that NAS provide knowledge spillover, which would have an effect on future
audit fees (Knechel & Sharma, 2012). Additionally, the impact of SOX on NAS fees
have also been studied (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009). These variables have been chosen to
examine the impact a change in auditor and the issuance of a GCMO will have on these
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different types of fees. Also, consistent with prior research, since auditor switching is
inherently a change variable, the dependent variables of interest in these three hypotheses
were the change in fees from one year to the next (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 2009; Feldmann
et al., 2009; Ettredge et al., 2007). Consistent with this research, ∆AUDIT FEES and
∆NAS FEES were calculated as the difference between the natural log of the respective
fees in year t-1 and year t and were collected from Audit Analytics.
The second hypothesis did not use some form of fees as the dependent variable –
instead the dependent variable in the second hypothesis was auditor dismissal
(∆AUDITOR). The decision to change auditors happens for a variety of reasons. When
a GCMO is received, studies have shown an increase in the number of firms changing
auditors (Chow & Rice, 1982; Krishnan, 1994). This variable was selected to explore the
relation between firms receiving a GCMO and the impact of receiving the opinion when
there is a change in auditor. ∆AUDITOR was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 when
an auditor dismissal has occurred and a 0 if there was no auditor dismissal in year t and
was collected from Audit Analytics. The dependent variable for the “low-balling”
hypothesis (H5b) was the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees. Finally, the dependent variable
for the “bribe” hypothesis (H5c) was the issuance of a GCMO. This variable was
dichotomous and coded as a 1 if a GCMO was issued in year t and 0 otherwise.
3.2.2 Test Variables
Audit risk has been shown to have a positive relation with audit fees. The
issuance of a GCMO has been used as a measure of risk to the auditor (Simunic, 1980;
Ettredge et al., 2007) and has been identified as a possible reason to perform additional
audit work (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006). As noted above, the extent of the change in
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fees and the nature of the fees involved has had mixed results but generally, the relation
with audit fees has been positive (e.g., Ettredge et al., 2007; Desir et al., 2014; Huang et
al., 2009) while the findings regarding the relation with NAS fees have not been
conclusive. However, as noted earlier, NAS fees are usually lower in the first few years
of the auditor tenure (Ghosh et al., 2006). Therefore, I predicted a positive relation
between the issuance of a GCMO and audit fees and a relation between the issuance of a
GCMO and NAS fees. The issuance of a first-time GCMO was included in both models
testing Hypotheses 1 and was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 when a first time
GCMO was issued and a 0 if it was not a first time GCMO in year t-1. Data for the
issuance of a first-time GCMO was obtained from Audit Analytics.
The receipt of a GCMO has been shown to be positively related to changing
auditors (Carey, Geiger, & O’Connell, 2008; Chow & Rice, 1982; Geiger et al., 1998;
Ettredge et al., 2007). Hypothesis 2 tested this relation. Consistent with this prior
research, the relation between changing auditors (∆AUDITOR) and the issuance of a
GCMO was expected to be positive. Once again, GCMO was a dichotomous variable
coded as a 1 when a first-time GCMO was issued and 0 if it was not a first-time GCMO.
Literature on audit and NAS fees after a change in auditor has produced mixed
results. As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a significant amount of research that
documents a relation between a change in auditor and audit fees (e.g. Asthana, Balsam, &
Kim, 2009; Ebrahim, 2010; Elliott et al., 2013; Craswell & Francis, 1999; Desir et al.,
2014). However, the nature of that relation has had mixed results in prior studies
depending on the circumstances surrounding the change. DeBerg et al. (1991) found no
significant relation between NAS fees and changing auditors prior to the change in
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auditors. However, for those firms that did change auditors, there was a significant
decline in NAS fees after the change in auditor. Hypothesis 3 examined the relation
between changing auditors and the change in fees (both audit and NAS). To examine this
relation, the variable for auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR) was included. Given the mixed
results in the prior literature, I did not predict a direction on the relation between auditor
dismissals and the change in audit fees and between auditor dismissals and the change in
NAS fees. ∆AUDITOR was a dichotomous variable with 1 representing that there has
been an auditor dismissal and 0 indicating that there has not been an auditor dismissal in
year t. The auditor dismissal information was obtained from Audit Analytics.
Hypothesis 4 examined the effect of the interaction between the test variable in
the first hypothesis – issuance of a first time GCMO and the test variable in the third
hypothesis –auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR). Both of these independent variables and an
interaction variable (GCMO*∆AUDITOR) was included to determine if the interaction of
these two variables has a significant effect on the results. As no prior research has been
done in this area, I did not predict a direction on the relation between the change in fees
(audit and NAS) and the interaction term of GCMO and auditor dismissal.
Hypothesis 5 examined other potential reasons why companies purchase
additional NAS after the issuance of a GCMO. The first two alternatives examined
utilize the same test variables as the first, third and fourth hypotheses noted above. In the
third alternative, the “bribe” hypothesis (H5c), the test variables are NAS fees (NAS
FEES), auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR) and the interaction of these two variables (NAS
FEES*∆AUDITOR) to determine if the auditor was being compensated for changing
their opinion.
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3.2.3 Control Variables – for the Fee Models (H1, H3, H4 and H5a/b)
Variables related to the company and the audit engagement and their effect on
audit and NAS fees have been examined since this stream of research began (Hay et al.,
2006). Relying on prior research, control variables previously used in audit fee models
were identified.
Prior research has shown a positive relation between Big 4 accounting firms and
fees (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Elliott et al., 2013; Whisenant et al., 2003; Ashbaugh
et al., 2003). A variable for Big 4 (BIG4) was included in this study. This was a
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the company was audited by a Big 4 firm in year
t-1 and 0 indicating the audit was performed by a non-Big 4 firm. This variable was
obtained from Audit Analytics.
Previous studies have identified several factors that measure firm complexity,
which is expected to increase the amount of audit time (Simunic 1980). There has been a
positive relation established in the literature between the size of a company (SIZE) and
the amount of fees (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Elliott et al., 2013; Desir et al., 2014).
Consistent with prior literature, I controlled for the size of the company (SIZE) which
was measured by the log of total assets. Total assets were obtained from Compustat. The
literature indicates a positive relation between restated financial statements (RESTATE)
and audit fees (Feldmann et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009; Hoitash, Hoitash & Bedard,
2008; Whisenant et al., 2003). I controlled for financial restatements (RESTATE) as a
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating a financial restatement in year t-1 and 0 if there
had not been a restatement. Financial restatements were obtained from Audit Analytics.
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The number of business segments (SEGS) and foreign subsidiaries (FORSEGS)
have also been used as measures of complexity and have been shown to have a positive
relation with fees (Whisenant et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2013; Desir et al., 2014).
Business segment data was obtained from Compustat. Book to Market ratio (BM) has
been used in previous literature as a surrogate for growth (Raghunandan, Read, &
Whisenant, 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003) and a negative relation between this ratio and
fees has been shown (Whisenant et al., 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). The variable was
measured as the book value of equity to market capitalization. Book value of equity and
market capitalization were obtained from Compustat.
Prior research has indicated that audit fees are positively related to the inherent
risk of an audit (Simunic, 1980; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). Accounts receivable and
inventory (RECINV) have been used as a measure of this risk showing a positive
relationship with audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006;
Hoitash et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 2013). This variable was measured
by the total accounts receivable and inventory divided by total assets. In addition, prior
research indicated that merger or acquisition activity (MERGER) are indicators of audit
complexity and increase the need for additional audit and consulting services (Ashbaugh
et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2013). This was a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the
company had merger or acquisition activity and 0 if they did not have any merger or
acquisition activity in year t-1. Data for accounts receivable, inventory and merger or
acquisition activity was obtained from Compustat.
Internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) have been shown to have a positive
relation with fees (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Ettredge et al., 2007; Hoitash et al.,
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2008; Huang et al., 2009). This would indicate that as companies had internal control
issues, there was an increase in audit effort or a risk premium charged (Hoitash et al.,
2008). Once again, this was a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the company had a
material weakness in internal controls in year t-1 and 0 if they did not have a material
weakness. Data on ICMW was obtained from Audit Analytics.
To control for how profitability measures affect fees, an indicator variable for loss
and a variable for return on assets was included. Prior research has indicated that
profitability is an indicator of client business risk (Hoitash et al., 2008). A variable for
loss (LOSS) has been used as an indicator showing a positive relation with fees
(Whisenant et al., 2003; Hoitash et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2009; Desir et al., 2014). This
was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the company had negative net income and 0 if
they had positive net income in year t-1. Return on assets (ROA) was used as a measure
for firm performance and profitability. Return on assets has shown a negative relation
with audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003; Desir et al., 2014), NAS fees (Whisenant et al.,
2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003), and total fees (Ashbaugh et al., 2003). This variable was
measured as operating income divided by total assets in year t-1. Data for LOSS and
ROA was obtained from Compustat.
Potential bankruptcy is a high-risk area that can have a significant impact on audit
and NAS fees. Prior research has indicated that when a company is under financial
distress, they are more likely to have higher fees (Simunic 1980). A bankruptcy measure
(ZSCORE) has been used as a proxy for financial distress. Consistent with the majority
of recent research, I used the probit model of Zmijewski (1984) to determine the
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Zscore13. Prior research has consistently shown a positive relation between Zscore and
audit fees (Munsif et al., 2011; Sankaraguruswamy et al., 2012; Whisenant et al., 2003).
However, no studies have examined the relation between Zscore and NAS. Measures
used to create the Z-score were obtained from Compustat.
Prior literature has used liquidity (LIQ) of a company as a measure of client
failure risk. A negative relation between fees and liquidity has been observed (Whisenant
et al., 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Elliott et al., 2013). Liquidity was measured
as current assets divided by current liabilities and was obtained from Compustat.
Leverage (LEV) is another measure of the risk of a client failing. This variable has been
shown to have a positive relation with audit fees (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Elliott et
al., 2013) while there are mixed results for NAS (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Whisenant et al.,
2003). Leverage was measured as total debt divided by total assets in year t and the
information was obtained from Compustat.
In addition, prior literature has measured the relation between new financing
(NEWFIN)14 and audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2007; Hoitash et al., 2008; Whisenant et al.,
2003). The only one of these studies that had a significant relation between new
financing and fees was Whisenant et al. who found a positive relation between new
financing and NAS fees. Once again, this was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the
company issued new debt or equity in year t-1 and 0 if they did not. All of the variables
related to new financing were obtained from Compustat.

13

Zmijewski’s Zscore is calculated as follows: – 4.3 – 4.5X1 + 5.7X2 + .004X3 where X1 = net income /
total assets, X2 = total liabilities / total assets, and X3 = currents assets / current liabilities. The probit
function maps the value to a probability bounded between 0 and 1 making it easier to interpret.
14
New financing was considered debt, equity, and a combination of both.
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Another indicator of potential audit risk is management turnover. Huang, Parker,
Yan, and Lin (2014) found mixed results in their examination of the relation between
CEO turnover and audit fees. They found a positive relation when the turnover was
forced but no significance when the turnover was voluntary. Feldmann et al. (2009)
examined the effect of restatement and management turnover on audit fees. They found
no significance between CEO turnover and audit fees but did find a negative relation
between CFO change and audit fees when a restatement occurred. Once again, these
were dichotomous variables coded as a 1 if the company experienced a change in
CEO/CFO and 0 if they did not experience a change in year t-1. These variables were
obtained from Audit Analytics – Director and Officer Change Module.
Report lag has been presumed to be an indicator of problems in an audit (Hay et
al., 2006). Audit report lag (ARL) is the period of time that passes between the balance
sheet date and the date of issuance of the audit report. Whisenant et al. (2003) found a
positive relation between report lag and audit fees but did not include report lag as a
variable in their NAS fee model. Ettredge et al. (2007) only examined audit fees and
found a positive relation between report lag and audit fees. To compute this variable, I
determined the number of days between the balance sheet date and the date the audit was
issued as reported in Audit Analytics.
Prior literature has also included control variables for year and industry (Huang et
al., 2014). Year (YEAR) was the fiscal year end and industry (INDUS) was the Standard
Industrial Classification code. These variables were obtained from Compustat.
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3.2.4 Control Variables – for the Auditor Dismissal Model (H2)
Prior studies attempted to examine the relation between changing auditors and
audit firm size (typically operationalized as Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 firm). Carey et al.
(2008) found no evidence that audit firm size affected a company’s decision to change
auditors. Schwartz and Menon (1985) examined the direction of the change when there
was an auditor switch and found a higher percentage of companies switching from a Big
4 firm to a non-Big 4 firm. This was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the company
was audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 if it was audited by a non-Big 4 firm in year t-1 and the
variable was obtained from Audit Analytics.
There has been a negative relation established in the literature between changing
auditors and the size of the company being audited (SIZE) due to the high cost of
changing auditors for larger companies (Krishnan, 1994; Carey et al., 2008; Mande &
Son, 2013). The size of the firm is generally measured by total assets, therefore, this
variable was measured by the log of total assets obtained from Compustat. When audited
financial statements are restated (RESTATE), Mande and Son (2013) found a positive
relation with a change in auditor in the year following the restatement. Once again, this
was a dichotomous variable with a 1 indicating a financial restatement in year t-1 and 0 if
no restatement has occurred. This variable was obtained from Audit Analytics.
Mande and Son (2013) expected and found that the more complex a company
was; the more likely material errors would occur which could trigger a change in auditor.
They measured complexity by the number of business segments (SEGS)15. The number
of business segments variable was obtained from Compustat.

15

Mande and Son measured this variable as the square root of the number of business segments in order to
normalize the distribution. I will calculate the variable in the same manner.
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Krishnan (1994) found inconsistent results for the relation between accounts
receivable and inventory (RECINC) and the type of opinions received when there were
auditor changes. When comparing unqualified opinions to qualified opinions, there was a
negative relation between these two assets and changing auditors. When comparing
qualified opinions to GCMOs, there was a positive relation between these assets and
auditor changes. This variable was measured by the total accounts receivable and
inventory divided by total assets and the information was obtained from Compustat.
Prior literature has indicated when a company has a merger or acquisition
(MERGER), they are more likely to switch auditors (Chow & Rice, 1982; Mande & Son,
2013). However, results have been mixed as to the significance and consistency of this
relation. In the Chow and Rice (1982) study, they did not find significant results. In
contrast, Mande and Son (2013) found a positive relation for some of the years observed,
however, their findings were not significant for all the years observed. This was a
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating that the company had merger or acquisition
activity and 0 if they did not have any merger or acquisition activity in year t-1 and this
variable was obtained from Compustat. The literature also indicated that firms with
losses (LOSS) were more risky due to their financial distress and had a positive relation
between losses and auditor changes (Krishnan, 1994; Mande & Son, 2013). Once again,
loss was defined as a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the company had negative
net income in year t-1 and 0 if income was positive and this variable was obtained from
Compustat.
In Mande and Son’s (2013) study on auditor changes, they found a statistical
difference for return on assets (ROA) for companies that changed auditors versus those
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that did not change auditors who showed a more negative return on assets. However,
when they ran their regression on change in auditor, return on assets was only statistically
significant and negative in one of the six years studied. All other years were positive and
not significant. ROA was calculated as operating income divided by total assets in year t1 obtained from Compustat.
Prior research has indicated that when a company is under financial distress, they
are more likely to switch auditors (Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Carey et al., 2008). A
bankruptcy measure (ZSCORE) has been used as a proxy for financial distress showing a
positive relation with change in auditor (Carey et al., 2008). Once again, Zmijewski’s
model was used to calculate Z-score as identified above. All of the variables in this
calculation were obtained from Compustat. Higher leverage (LEV) has also transpired as
a signal of financial risk. Prior research has suggested that the more financial risk a
company has, the more likely they are to change auditors (Krishnan, 1994). However,
Mande and Son (2013) showed mixed results where half the observed years reflected a
positive relation, one year showed a negative relation, and the other two years had no
significant relation. The variable was measured as total debt divided by total assets at
year t-1 and was obtained from Compustat.
Internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) have been shown to have a positive
relation with change in auditor (Ettredge, Heintz, Li, & Scholz, 2011). This would
indicate that as companies have internal control issues, there is an increasing likelihood
of a change in auditor. Once again, this was a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating the
company had a material weakness in internal controls in year t-1 and 0 if they did not
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have a material weakness in the current year. Data on ICMW was obtained from Audit
Analytics.
Auditor tenure (TENURE) is expected to have a negative relation with change in
auditor. In other words, as the tenure of auditor increases, the likelihood decreases that
the company will change auditors. Auditor tenure was measured as the continuous
number of years that the auditor has been engaged by the company. Data on TENURE
was obtained from Audit Analytics.
3.2.5 Control Variables – for the Bribe Model (H5c)
Several control variables have been identified in prior studies that examined the
relation between issuance of a GCMO and NAS fees. In reviewing this stream of
research, the following control variables were identified.
Two studies have attempted to examine the effect of audit firm size on this
relation. Fargher and Jiang (2008) found a significant negative relation between audit
firm size and the issuance of a GCMO while DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam
(2002) found a positive relation between audit firm size and the issuance of a going
concern opinion. This was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the company was
audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 if it was audited by a non-Big 4 firm in year t-1 and the
variable was obtained from Audit Analytics.
Two studies found a significant relation between the issuance of a GCMO and the
size of the company being audited (SIZE) (Blay & Geiger, 2013; Fargher & Jiang, 2008).
Both of these studies found that the relation between the issuance of a going concern
opinion and the size of the company was negative. This variable was measured by the
log of total assets obtained from Compustat.

60
Many different surrogates have been used to identify clients under financial
distress. Several studies used a bankruptcy measure (generally some variation of a Zscore) as one of the control variables in their studies. However, depending on the study,
the results have been mixed. Callaghan, Parkash, and Singhal (2009), Fargher and Jiang
(2008), and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) all found a negative relation between the Z-score
measure in their studies and the issuance of a going concern opinion while DeFond et al.
(2002) found that relation to be positive. Consistent with the methodology above,
measures used to create the Z-score was obtained from Compustat.
Prior literature has also used the liquidity (LIQ) of a company as a measure of
client failure risk. A negative relation between the issuance of a going concern opinion
and liquidity has been observed (Fargher & Jiang, 2008; Robinson, 2008). Liquidity was
measured as current assets divided by current liabilities and this information was obtained
from Compustat. Leverage (LEV) was another measure of the risk of a client failing.
This variable has been shown to have a positive relation with the issuance of a going
concern opinion (Blay & Geiger, 2013; Fargher & Jiang, 2008). Leverage was measured
as total debt divided by total assets in year t and the information was obtained from
Compustat.
In addition, prior literature has measured the relation between new financing
(NEWFIN)16 and the issuance of a going concern opinion (Fargher & Jiang, 2008;
Robinson, 2008) with both studies finding that relation to be positive. Once again, this
was a dichotomous variable coded as a 1 if the company issued new debt or equity in

16

Consistent with the definitions in the prior section, new financing was considered debt, equity, and a
combination of both.
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year t-1 and 0 if they did not. All of the variables related to new financing was obtained
from Compustat.
As noted above, audit report lag (ARL) is the period of time that passes between
the balance sheet date and the date of issuance of the audit report. Blay and Geiger
(2013) and DeFond et al. (2002), found a positive relation between report lag and the
issuance of a going concern opinion, while Callaghan et al. (2009) found a negative
relation between these two variables. To compute this variable, I determined the number
of days between the balance sheet date and the date the audit was issued, as reported in
Audit Analytics.

Table 2
Variable Definitions (Model H1, H3, H4 and H5a/b – Fees)
Variable

Predicted Description
Sign

Alternative Dependent variables

∆ AUDIT FEES

Difference between the natural log of audit
fees in year t-1 and year t (Audit
Analytics)

∆ NAS FEES

Difference between the natural log of NAS
fees in year t-1 and year t (Audit
Analytics)

NAS FEES / AUDIT
FEES

NAS fees year t divided by audit fees year
t (Audit Analytics)

Test Variables
GCMO (H1)

?

1 if company receives a first-time going
concern modified opinion in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)
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∆AUDITOR (H3,
H5a/b)

?

1 if company dismissed their auditor in
year t, otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

GCMO*∆AUDITOR
(H4, H5a/b)

?

Interaction term between first-time going
concern in year t-1 and auditor dismissal
in year t (Audit Analytics)

Control Variables
BIG4

+

1 if auditor was a Big 4 firm in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

SIZE

+

Natural log of total assets in year t-1
(Compustat)

RESTATE

+/-

1 if there is a financial restatement in year
t-1, otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

SEGS

+

Square root of the number of business
segments in year t-1 (Compustat)

FORSEGS

+

Number of foreign segments in year t-1
(Compustat)

BM

-

Book to market equity ratio in year t-1
(Compustat)

RECINV

+

Accounts receivable and inventory
divided by total assets at year t-1
(Compustat)

MERGER

+

1 if company had a merger or acquisition
activity in year t-1 (Compustat)

ICMW

+

1 if company has a material weakness in
internal controls in year t-1, otherwise 0
(Audit Analytics)

LOSS

+

1 if company reports a loss in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Compustat)

ROA

-

Operating income divided by total assets
in year t-1 (Compustat)

+/-

Zmijewski’s Z score in year t-1 calculated
as: – 4.3 – 4.5X1 + 5.7X2 + .004X3 where
X1 = net income / total assets, X2 = total
liabilities / total assets, and X3 = currents
assets / current liabilities (Compustat)

ZSCORE
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LIQ

-

Current assets divided by current
liabilities at year t-1 (Compustat)

LEV

+/-

Total debt divided by total assets at year
t-1 (Compustat)

NEWFIN

+/-

1 if new financing (new equity or longterm debt) in year t-1, otherwise 0
(Compustat)

CEOTURN

+/-

1 if the company experienced a CEO
change during the year t-1, otherwise 0
(Audit Analytics – Director and Officer
Change Module)

CFOTURN

+/-

1 if the company experienced a CFO
change during the year t-1, otherwise 0
(Audit Analytics – Director and Officer
Change Module)

ARL

+/-

Number of days from the balance sheet
date to the date the audit report is issued
in year t-1 (Audit Analytics)

YEAR

+/-

Fiscal year end (Compustat)

INDUS

+/-

Standard Industrial Classification code
(Compustat)

MILLS

?

Inverse Mills ratio
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Table 3
Variable Definitions (Model H2-Change in Auditor)
Variable

Predicted Description
Sign

∆AUDITOR

1 if company dismissed their auditor in
year t, otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

Independent Variables
GCMO

+

1 if company receives a first-time going
concern modified opinion in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

Control Variables
BIG4

+/-

1 if auditor was a Big 4 firm in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

SIZE

-

Natural log of total assets in year t-1
(Compustat)

RESTATE

+

1 if there is a financial restatement in
year t-1, otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

SEGS

+

Square root of the number of business
segments in year t-1 (Compustat)

RECINV

+/-

Accounts receivable and inventory
divided by total assets at year t-1
(Compustat)

MERGER

+/-

1 if company had a merger or
acquisition activity in year t-1
(Compustat)

LOSS

+

ROA

+/-

Operating income divided by total assets
in year t-1 (Compustat)

+

Zmijewski Z score (1984) in year t-1
calculated as: – 4.3 – 4.5X1 + 5.7X2 +
.004X3. Where X1 = net income / total
assets, X2 = total liabilities / total assets,

ZSCORE

1 if company reports a loss in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Compustat)
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and X3 = currents assets / current
liabilities. (Compustat)
LEV

+/-

Total debt divided by total assets at year
t-1 (Compustat)

ICMW

+

1 if company has a material weakness in
internal controls in year t-1, otherwise 0
(Audit Analytics)

TENURE

-

The number of continuous years the
auditor has been engaged by the
company
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Table 4
Variable Definitions (Model H5c – Bribe Hypothesis)
Variable

Predicted Description
Sign

Dependent variable
GCMO

1 if company receives a first-time going
concern modified opinion in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

Test Variables
NAS FEES

?

Natural log of NAS fees in year t (Audit
Analytics)

∆AUDITOR

?

1 if company dismissed their auditor in
year t, otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

NAS FEES *
∆AUDITOR

?

Interaction term between natural log of
NAS fees and auditor dismissal in year t
(Audit Analytics)

Control Variables
BIG4

+

1 if auditor was a Big 4 firm in year t-1,
otherwise 0 (Audit Analytics)

SIZE

-

Natural log of total assets in year t-1
(Compustat)

ZSCORE

+/-

Zmijewski’s Z score in year t-1 calculated
as: – 4.3 – 4.5X1 + 5.7X2 + .004X3 where
X1 = net income / total assets, X2 = total
liabilities / total assets, and X3 = currents
assets / current liabilities (Compustat)

LIQ

-

Current assets divided by current
liabilities at year t-1 (Compustat)

LEV

+

Total debt divided by total assets at year
t-1 (Compustat)

NEWFIN

+

1 if new financing (new equity or longterm debt) in year t-1, otherwise 0
(Compustat)

+/-

Number of days from the balance sheet
date to the date the audit report is issued
in year t-1 (Audit Analytics)

ARL

CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the raw audit and NAS
fees paid to the auditor, the change in these fees from year to year and the dependent
variables for each of the models in this study. Companies purchased an average (median)
of $1,602,748 ($583,085) of audit fees and $386,322 ($59,000) of NAS fees per firmyear observation. The average change in audit fees was $109,485 while the average
change in NAS fees was a negative $6,702. The change in the natural log of audit fees
averaged 0.128 while the change in the natural log of NAS fees averaged -0.012. The
average ratio of NAS fees to audit fees (NASFEES/AUDITFEES) was 26.3%. Going
concern modified opinions (GCMO) were issued 13.8% of the time on average which is
consistent with prior literature (Desir et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2009). There was an
auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR) 6.8% of the time on average. This was relatively
consistent across all the years of this study (from a low of 5.4% in 2010 to a high of 8.7%
in 2005).17 On average, 2% of companies received a going concern opinion and
dismissed auditors (untabulated).
Panel B of Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the control variables. For
the type of auditors engaged, on average, 61.9% were Big 4 firms (BIG4). On average,
audit opinions were restated 9.8% of the time (RESTATE) and 11.5% of firm-year

17

The change in auditor percentage was greater than other studies that had a similar variable. However, no
prior study actually examined the same time period or the length of time period as this study.
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observations received an internal control material weakness report (ICMW). On average,
43.3% of the firm-year observations reported a loss (LOSS) and 42.3% reported new
financing (NEWIN). Auditors had an average of 8.6 years of tenure (TENURE) and an
average lag of 76 days was found for the issuance of the audit report after fiscal year end.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Raw Fees, Dependent
Variables and Test Variables
Mean
1,602,748

Median
583,085

SD
3,100,584

Quartile 1
155,000

Quartile 3
1,558,860

NAS FEES

386,322

59,000

976,304

6,340

279,183

∆AUDITFEES

109,485

12,000

633,987

-35,850

143,752

-6,702

0

384,045

-36,300

29,500

0.128

0.043

0.570

-0.075

0.250

-0.012

0.000

0.890

-0.288

0.252

NASFEES / AUDITFEES

0.263

0.122

1.774

0.022

0.310

GCMO

0.138

0.000

0.344

0.000

0.000

∆ AUDITOR

0.068

0.000

0.251

0.000

0.000

BIG4

Mean
0.619

Median
1.000

SD
0.486

Quartile 1
0.000

Quartile 3
1.000

SIZE

5.202

5.430

2.852

3.489

7.172

RESTATE

0.098

0.000

0.298

0.000

0.000

SEGS

2.092

1.732

0.863

1.732

2.828

FORSEGS

4.295

2.000

6.279

0.000

6.000

BM

0.308

0.384

1.499

0.159

0.700

RECINV

0.236

0.198

0.196

0.073

0.352

MERGER

0.135

0.000

0.341

0.000

0.000

ICMW

0.115

0.000

0.320

0.000

0.000

LOSS

0.433

0.000

0.495

0.000

1.000

ROA

-0.461

0.045

2.283

-0.112

0.106

ZSCORE

8.853

5.370

16.909

4.403

6.834

LIQ

2.946

1.918

3.591

1.149

3.277

LEV

0.221

0.105

0.381

0.000

0.296

NEWFIN

0.423

0.000

0.494

0.000

1.000

CEOTURN

0.113

0.000

0.317

0.000

0.000

AUDIT FEES

∆NASFEES
LN∆AUDITFEES
LN∆NASFEES

Panel B: Control Variables
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CFOTURN
ARL
TENURE

0.151

0.000

0.358

0.000

0.000

76.453

72.000

30.955

58.000

87.000

8.595

4.000

12.260

2.000

9.000

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2

Table 6 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables. The potential for
multi-collinearity is assessed at the 0.8 level (Kennedy, 2008). There are several
variables whose correlations are significant and those are highlighted in bold. However,
only one correlation exceeded the 0.8 threshold. The correlation between return on assets
(ROA) and Z-score (ZSCORE) was -0.902. The Z-Score is a calculated variable with
one of the major components of the calculation being return on assets. Therefore, it is
expected that these two variables would be highly correlated. In addition, variance
inflation factors (VIF) range from 1.002 to 7.629 across all variables and all models,
which is below the recommended score of 10 (Kennedy, 2008).

0.002
-0.104
-0.024
-0.052
0.025
-0.040
-0.031
-0.031
-0.027
-0.026
-0.033
-0.038
-0.002
-0.012
0.006
-0.029
-0.014
-0.041
-0.047
-0.008

GCMO

∆ AUDITOR

BIG4

SIZE

RESTATE

SEGS

FORSEGS

BM

RECINV

MERGER

ICMW

LOSS

ROA

ZSCORE

LIQ

LEV

NEWFIN

CEOTURN

CFOTURN

ARL

0.004

-0.007

0.001

-0.023

-0.013

0.002

-0.001

-0.003

-0.017

-0.010

-0.029

-0.004

-0.014

-0.014

-0.016

-0.021

-0.029

-0.027

-0.022

0.009

LN∆
NASFEES

0.233

0.045

0.086

-0.144

0.184

-0.176

0.445

-0.476

0.336

0.245

-0.097

-0.122

-0.343

-0.200

-0.181

-0.007

-0.552

-0.385

0.128

GCMO

Note: Variable definitions can be found in Table 2
Correlation significant at the p < 0.05 level are in bold (2-tailed).

0.069

LN∆NASFEES

LN∆AUDITFEES

LN∆
AUDITFEES

Table 6

0.074

0.033

0.035

-0.045

-0.005

-0.026

0.058

-0.073

0.054

0.099

-0.037

-0.012

-0.023

-0.064

-0.064

0.011

-0.158

-0.108

∆ AUDITOR

-0.151

-0.059

-0.067

0.185

-0.016

0.005

-0.218

0.257

-0.246

-0.185

0.113

-0.045

0.123

0.280

0.170

-0.006

0.645

BIG4

-0.228

-0.021

-0.060

0.321

-0.001

-0.044

-0.406

0.483

-0.410

-0.200

0.201

0.027

0.243

0.381

0.299

-0.022

SIZE

Pearson Correlation Matrix

-0.023

0.016

0.005

0.003

-0.002

-0.006

-0.004

0.002

0.016

0.022

-0.014

0.015

0.012

-0.025

0.020

RESTATE

-0.044

-0.010

-0.033

0.135

0.013

-0.027

-0.072

0.104

-0.111

-0.065

0.070

0.138

0.097

0.092

SEGS

-0.066

-0.014

-0.027

0.105

-0.068

-0.020

-0.131

0.148

-0.156

-0.066

0.112

0.130

0.089

FORSEGS

-0.086

-0.001

-0.020

0.051

-0.305

0.137

-0.294

0.248

-0.135

-0.071

0.046

0.076

BM

-0.022

-0.007

-0.011

0.037

-0.056

-0.110

-0.083

0.111

-0.135

-0.029

-0.008

RECINV
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-0.068
0.067
-0.050
-0.041
0.013
0.093
0.005
0.017
-0.072

LOSS

ROA

ZSCORE

LIQ

LEV

NEWFIN

CEOTURN

CFOTURN

ARL

0.248

0.114

0.092

-0.066

0.020

-0.071

0.160

-0.171

0.132

ICMW

Correlation significant at the p < 0.05 level are in bold (2-tailed).

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.

-0.032

MERGER

ICMW

MERGER

0.174

0.080

0.100

-0.098

0.126

0.057

0.288

-0.294

LOSS

-0.159

-0.021

-0.052

0.109

-0.179

0.112

-0.902

ROA

0.155

0.020

0.047

-0.046

0.381

-0.136

ZSCORE

-0.058

-0.010

-0.019

-0.150

-0.209

LIQ

0.062

0.000

0.014

0.223

LEV

Table 6
Pearson Correlation Matrix (continued)

-0.039

-0.015

-0.024

NEWFIN

0.022

0.250

CEOTURN

0.015

CFOTURN
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4.2 Hypotheses Results
The results of Hypotheses 1a and 3a are presented in Table 7. Hypotheses 1a and
3a use the same dependent variable, ∆AUDITFEES18, with hypothesis 1a using GCMO
as the variable of interest and hypothesis 3a using ∆AUDITOR as the variable of interest.
The overall F statistic for this model was 38.162 which is significant (p = .000) with an
adjusted R2 of 0.066. Coefficients for industry and year indicator variables are included
but not reported for expositional purposes19.
Hypothesis 1a predicted a positive relation between a first-time GCMO and the
change in audit fees. The results indicate that GCMO is statistically significant (p =
.001), however, the relation is negative indicating that audit fees decreased when a first
time GCMO was received. This hypothesis is not supported. One potential explanation
for these results is that firms receiving a first-time GCMO are in financial distress and
therefore are seeking ways to reduce costs including their audit fee20.
Hypothesis 3a predicted a relation, but no expected direction, between auditor
dismissal and the change in audit fees. This hypothesis is supported as the results
indicate that ∆AUDITOR has a negative and statistically significant (p = .000) relation to
∆AUDITFEES suggesting that when an auditor dismissal occurs, audit fees decline.

18

As noted in the methodology section above, the dependent variables ∆AUDITFEES and ∆NASFEES are
calculated as the difference between the natural log of the respective fees in year t-1 and year t. I also used
the percentage change in respective fees from the prior year as an alternative dependent variable with no
substantive difference in the results.
19
I also analyzed this model without the Mills ratio and found consistent results. The overall F statistic for
this model without the Mills Ratio was 38.203 which was significant (p = .000) with an adjusted R2 =
0.065.
20
I also analyzed this model with GCMO as the only independent variable of interest with the same control
variables (i.e., removed ∆AUDITOR from the model). The results were qualitatively the same – the Fstatistic for the model was 29.962 (p = .000) with an adjusted R2 of 0.052 and GCMO was significant and
negatively related to ∆AUDITFEES.
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For the control variables, MERGER, NEWFIN, and ARL, these are all positive
and statistically significantly (p = .014, .053, .000, respectively) related to ∆AUDITFEES
which is consistent with prior literature (Elliott et al., 2013; Ettredge et al., 2007;
Whisenant et al., 2003). The results for BIG4, SIZE, SEGS, RECINV, ICMW, and
LOSS (all have a p = .000) have a negative association with ∆AUDITFEES which was
not seen in prior research. The variables BM, ROA, and LIQ (p = .000, .023, .026,
respectively) are negative and significantly associated with ∆AUDIT FEES which is also
consistent with prior literature (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003). Although
I did not predict a direction, ZSCORE, LEV, CEOTURN, CFOTURN, and MILLS (p =
.005, .000, .093, .072, and .000, respectively) are negative and statistically associated
with ∆AUDITFEES. RESTATE and FORSEGS are not statistically significant.
Table 7
Regression of AUDIT FEES on GCMO and ∆AUDITOR
∆AUDIT FEESt = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 BIG 4t-1 + β4 SIZEt-1 + β5 RESTATEt-1 + β6 SEGSt-1 +
β7 FORSEGSt-1 + β8 BMt-1 + β9 RECINVt-1 + β10 MERGERt-1 + β11 ICMWt-1 + β12 LOSSt-1 + β13 ROAt-1 +
β14 ZSCOREt-1 + β15 LIQt-1 + β16 LEVt-1 + β17 NEWFINt-1 + β18 CEOTURNt-1 + β19 CFOTURNt-1 +
β20 ARLt-1 + β21 YEARt-1 + β22 INDUSt-1 + β23 MILLSt + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficient

T-stat

p-value

0.700

30.478

0.000

GCMO

?

-0.032

-3.167

0.001

***

∆AUDITOR

?

-0.277

-27.249

0.000

***

BIG4

+

-0.038

-5.364

0.000

***

SIZE

+

-0.007

-3.609

0.000

***

RESTATE

+/-

0.011

1.450

0.147

SEGS

+

-0.016

-5.697

0.000

FORSEGS

+

0.000

-0.881

0.189

BM

-

-0.013

-4.979

0.000

***

RECINV

+

-0.154

-9.676

0.000

***

MERGER

+

0.019

2.203

0.014

**

ICMW

+

-0.033

-3.422

0.000

***

LOSS

+

-0.078

-13.142

0.000

***

***
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ROA

-

-0.008

-2.001

0.023

**

+/-

-0.002

-2.817

0.005

***

LIQ

-

-0.002

-1.939

0.026

**

LEV

+/-

-0.042

-4.278

0.000

***

NEWFIN

+/-

0.011

1.938

0.053

*

CEOTURN

+/-

-0.015

-1.677

0.093

*

CFOTURN

+/-

-0.014

-1.798

0.072

*

ARL

+/-

0.000

4.240

0.000

***

?

-0.065

-5.671

0.000

***

ZSCORE

MILLS
Industries

included

Years

included

Observations

48,414

Adjusted R2

0.066

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

The results of Hypotheses 1b and 3b are presented in Table 8. Hypotheses 1b and
3b use the same dependent variable ∆NASFEES with hypothesis 1b using GCMO as the
variable of interest and hypothesis 3b using ∆AUDITOR as the variable of interest. The
overall F-Statistic for this model is 4.212 and significant (p = .000) and the adjusted R2 is
0.006. Once again, coefficients for industry and year indicator variables are included but
not reported for expositional purposes21.
Hypothesis 1b predicts a relation, but no expected direction, between a first-time
going concern modified opinion and the change in NAS fees. The results indicate that
GCMO is not statistically associated (p = .273) with ∆NASFEES and therefore, this
hypothesis is not supported.

21

I also analyzed this model without the Mills ratio being included and found consistent results. The
overall F-statistic for this model without the Mills Ratio was 4.239 which was significant (p = .000) with an
adjusted R2 of 0.006.
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Hypothesis 3b predicts a relation, but no expected direction, between auditor
dismissal and the change in NAS fees. This hypothesis is supported as the results
indicate that ∆AUDITOR has a negative statistically significant (p = .000) relation to
∆NASFEES which suggests that when an auditor dismissal occurs, NAS fees decline.
The control variable book to market value (BM) is negative and significantly (p =
.003) related to ∆NASFEES which is consistent with prior literature (Ashbaugh et al.,
2003). The results for SIZE, MERGER, ICMW, and LOSS (p = .001, .000, .000, .000,
respectively) have a negative association with ∆NASFEES which is not consistent with
prior research. Although I did not predict a direction, RESTATE, LEV, and NEWFIN (p
= .000, .056, and .040 respectively) are negative and statistically associated with
∆NASFEES. No other control variables are statistically significant.

Table 8
Regression of NAS FEES on GCMO and ∆AUDITOR
∆ NASFEESt = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 BIG 4t-1 + β4 SIZEt-1 + β5 RESTATEt-1 + β6 SEGSt-1 +
β7 FORSEGSt-1 + β8 BMt-1 + β9 RECINVt-1 + β10 MERGERt-1 + β11 ICMWt-1 + β12 LOSSt-1 + β13 ROAt-1 +
β14 ZSCOREt-1 + β15 LIQt-1 + β16 LEVt-1 + β17 NEWFINt-1 + β18 CEOTURNt-1 + β19 CFOTURNt-1 +
β20 ARLt-1 + β21 YEARt-1 + β22 INDUSt-1 + β23 MILLSt + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficient

T-stat

p-value

0.170

4.607

0.000

GCMO

?

-0.018

-1.097

0.273

∆AUDITOR

?

-0.090

-5.510

0.000

BIG4

+

-0.017

-1.494

0.135

SIZE

+

-0.009

-2.969

0.001

***

+/-

-0.051

-3.973

0.000

***

SEGS

+

-0.002

-0.499

0.309

FORSEGS

+

0.000

-0.461

0.322

BM

-

-0.012

-2.790

0.003

RECINV

+

-0.010

-0.398

0.345

MERGER

+

-0.086

-6.199

0.000

RESTATE

***

***

***
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ICMW

+

-0.056

-3.542

0.000

***

LOSS

+

-0.059

-6.259

0.000

***

ROA

-

0.005

0.856

0.196

+/-

0.000

0.337

0.736

LIQ

-

-0.001

-1.101

0.135

LEV

+/-

-0.030

-1.911

0.056

*

NEWFIN

+/-

-0.019

-2.054

0.040

**

CEOTURN

+/-

0.010

0.708

0.479

CFOTURN

+/-

-0.014

-1.104

0.270

ARL

+/-

0.000

0.237

0.813

?

-0.025

-1.343

0.179

ZSCORE

MILLS
Industries

included

Years

included

Observations
Adjusted

48,414

R2

0.006

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

Hypothesis 2 posits a positive relation between auditor dismissal (∆AUDITOR)
and GCMO. The results for Hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 9. The Nagelkerke
pseudo R2 is 0.088 and the model Chi Square is statistically significant at 0.000.
Consistent with hypothesis 2, the results indicate that there is a positive relation
between ∆AUDITOR and GCMO (p = .000). As a company receives a first time going
concern opinion, it is more likely to dismiss auditors. For the control variables,
RESTATE and ICMW are positive and significantly associated with changing auditors (p
= .041 and .000, respectively), consistent with prior literature (Ettredge et al., 2007;
Mande & Son, 2013). The results for SIZE and TENURE are negatively and
significantly associated with changing auditors (p = .000, and .000, respectively),
consistent with prior research (Carey et al., 2008; Mande & Son, 2013). Conflicting with
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previous research, the results for SEGS and LOSS are negatively and significantly
associated with changing auditors (p =.008 and .002, respectively). Although I did not
predict a direction, RESTATE and ROA have a positive and significant relation and LEV
has a negative significant relationship with changing auditors (p = .041, .047, and .099,
respectively). The control variables RECINV, MERGER, and ZSCORE were not found
to be significant.

Table 9
Regression of ∆AUDITOR on GCMO
∆AUDITOR t = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 BIG 4t-1 + β3 SIZEt-1 + β4 RESTATEt-1 + β5 SEGSt-1 + β6 RECINVt-1 + β7 MERGERt-1 +
β8 LOSSt-1 + β9 ROAt-1 + β10 ZSCOREt-1 + β11 LEVt-1 + β12 ICMWt-1 + β13 TENUREt-1 + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Coefficient

Wald

p-value

-1.666

707.996

0.000

+

0.332

33.449

0.000

***

BIG4

+/-

0.129

6.673

0.010

*

SIZE

-

-0.153

189.359

0.000

***

RESTATE

+

0.113

4.180

0.041

**

SEGS

+

-0.060

6.965

0.008

***

RECINV

+/-

0.139

2.437

0.118

MERGER

+/-

-0.075

1.011

0.315

LOSS

+

-0.126

9.238

0.002

***

ROA

+/-

0.039

3.947

0.047

**

+

-0.001

0.087

0.769

+/-

-0.091

2.729

0.099

*

ICMW

+

0.587

136.702

0.000

***

TENURE

-

-0.064

187.731

0.000

***

Constant
GCMO

ZSCORE
LEV

Observations
Pseudo

48,414

R2

Chi Square

.088
1690.416

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 3.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.
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Hypothesis 4a posits that there is a change in the relation between an auditor
dismissal and the change in audit fees when there is the issuance of a first-time GCMO.
The results for Hypothesis 4a are presented in Table 10. The overall F-statistic is 42.107
and significant (p = .000) and the adjusted R2 is 0.073. Coefficients for industry and year
indicator variables are included but not reported for expositional purposes.
The variable of interest in this hypothesis, GCMO*∆AUDITOR, is positive and
significantly associated with the change in audit fees (p = .000). As indicated in the
Hypotheses 3a results above, the relationship between auditor dismissal and the change in
audit fees was found to be negative and significant. Therefore, the positive relationship
of this interaction variable indicates support for Hypothesis 4a – a first-time GCMO has a
moderating effect on the relation between auditor dismissal and the change in audit fees.
For the control variables, MERGER is positive and significant (p = .015),
consistent with prior literature (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2013). Similar to
prior research, the control variables that have a negative relation and significant are BM,
ROA, and LIQ (p = .000, .013, and .031, respectively) (Ashbaugh et al., 2003;
Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Whisenant et al., 2003). Opposite to the expected
direction, BIG4, SIZE, SEGS, RECINV, ICMW, and LOSS are all negative and
significant (all have a p = .000). Not predicting a direction, I find that NEWFIN and
ARL are positive and significant (p = .055 and .000) while ZSCORE, LEV, CEOTURN,
CFOTURN, and MILLS are negative and significant (p = .002, .000, .064, .057, and .000,
respectively). RESTATE and FORSEGS are not found to be significant.
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Table 10
Regression of AUDIT FEES on GCMO * ∆AUDITOR
∆AUDIT FEES t = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt-1*∆AUDITORt + β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 +
β6 RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8 FORSEGSt-1 + β9 BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 + β12 ICMWt-1 +
β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt-1 + β16 LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 + β19 CEOTURNt-1 +
β20 CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22 YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24 MILLSt + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficients

T-stat

p-value

0.709

30.991

0.000

GCMO

?

-0.092

-8.672

0.000

***

∆AUDITOR

?

-0.396

-33.458

0.000

***

GCMO * ∆AUDITOR

?

0.441

19.433

0.000

***

BIG4

+

-0.040

-5.604

0.000

***

SIZE

+

-0.007

-3.485

0.000

***

+/-

0.011

1.453

0.146

SEGS

+

-0.015

-5.335

0.000

FORSEGS

+

0.000

-0.980

0.164

BM

-

-0.014

-5.237

0.000

***

RECINV

+

-0.149

-9.399

0.000

***

MERGER

+

0.019

2.162

0.015

**

ICMW

+

-0.033

-3.376

0.000

***

LOSS

+

-0.073

-12.394

0.000

***

ROA

-

-0.009

-2.214

0.013

**

+/-

-0.002

-3.093

0.002

***

LIQ

-

-0.001

-1.860

0.031

**

LEV

+/-

-0.039

-3.949

0.000

***

NEWFIN

+/-

0.011

1.918

0.055

*

CEOTURN

+/-

-0.016

-1.849

0.064

*

CFOTURN

+/-

-0.015

-1.905

0.057

*

ARL

+/-

0.000

4.301

0.000

***

?

-0.069

-6.084

0.000

***

RESTATE

ZSCORE

MILLS
Industries

included

Years

included

Observations
Adjusted

R2

48,414
0.073

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

***
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Hypothesis 4b posits that there is a change in the relation between an auditor
dismissal and the change in NAS fees when there is the issuance of a first-time GCMO.
Hypothesis 5a posits a company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases additional NAS
from their new auditor in order to compensate the auditor for engaging with a more risky
client. The results for Hypothesis 4b and 5a are presented in Table 11. The overall Fstatistic is 4.312 and significant (p = .000) and the adjusted R2 is 0.006. Again,
coefficients for industry and year indicator variables are included but not reported for
expositional purposes.
The variable of interest for Hypothesis 4b, GCMO*∆AUDITOR, is positive and
significantly associated with the change in NAS fees (p = .000). As indicated in the
hypothesis 3b results above, the relationship between auditor dismissal and NAS fees was
found to be negative and significant. Therefore, the positive relationship of this
interaction variable indicates support for hypothesis 4b – a first-time GCMO has a
moderating effect on the relation between auditor dismissal and the change in NAS fees.
The test of client riskiness in Hypothesis 5a examines the coefficients of
∆AUDITOR (β2) and GCMO*∆AUDITOR (β3) in this model. Specifically, the test for
this hypothesis is whether the coefficients for β2 (∆AUDITOR) + β3
(GCMO*∆AUDITOR) is greater than zero. The β2 (∆AUDITOR) coefficient is -0.126
and the β3 (GCMO*∆AUDITOR) coefficient is 0.134 for a total of 0.006 which is not
statistically significantly greater than zero (p = .799), indicating no support for this
hypothesis. In other words, a client does not necessarily purchase additional NAS to
compensate the auditor for the additional risk associated with the issuance of a first-time
GCMO.
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The control variable BM has a negative and significant relation (p = .005), which
is consistent with prior literature (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003).
Opposite to the expected direction, SIZE, MERGER, ICMW, and LOSS are negative and
significant (p = .003, .000, .000, and .000, respectively). Not predicting a direction, I
found RESTATE, LEV, and NEWFIN are negative and significant (p = .000, .065, and
.039, respectively). All other variables are not significant.

Table 11
Regression of NAS FEES on GCMO * ∆AUDITOR
∆NAS FEES t = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt-1*∆AUDITORt + β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 +
β6 RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8 FORSEGSt-1 + β9 BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 + β12 ICMWt-1 +
β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt-1 + β16 LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 + β19 CEOTURNt-1 +
β20 CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22 YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24 MILLSt + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficients

T-stat

p-value

0.173

4.682

0.000

GCMO

?

-0.036

-2.112

0.035

**

∆AUDITOR

?

-0.126

-6.612

0.000

***

GCMO * ∆AUDITOR

?

0.134

3.666

0.000

***

BIG4

+

-0.018

-1.535

0.125

SIZE

+

-0.009

-2.944

0.003

***

+/-

-0.051

-3.974

0.000

***

SEGS

+

-0.002

-0.427

0.670

FORSEGS

+

0.000

-0.479

0.632

BM

-

-0.012

-2.836

0.005

RECINV

+

-0.009

-0.339

0.735

MERGER

+

-0.086

-6.210

0.000

***

ICMW

+

-0.056

-3.531

0.000

***

LOSS

+

-0.058

-6.106

0.000

***

ROA

-

0.005

0.817

0.414

+/-

0.000

0.287

0.774

LIQ

-

-0.001

-1.085

0.278

LEV

+/-

-0.029

-1.846

0.065

*

NEWFIN

+/-

-0.019

-2.060

0.039

**

CEOTURN

+/-

0.010

0.677

0.498

RESTATE

ZSCORE

***
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CFOTURN

+/-

-0.014

-1.123

0.261

ARL

+/-

0.000

0.246

0.806

?

-0.026

-1.417

0.157

MILLS
Industries

Included

Years

Included

Observations
Adjusted

R2

48,414
0.006

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 2.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

Hypothesis 5b posits a company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases
additional NAS from their new auditor to compensate the auditor for lowballing their
audit fee. The results for Hypothesis 5b are presented in Table 12. The dependent
variable in this table is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and the variables of interest are
∆AUDITOR and GCMO*∆AUDITOR. As the dependent variable in this test includes
audit fees in the denominator, there is a concern that small denominators may cause
extreme observations to drive the results. To mitigate this issue, I remove observations
with audit fees that are less than or equal to $1,000 which results in the removal of seven
observations22. The F-statistic for this model is 14.249 (p = .000) and the adjusted R2 is
0.025.

22

A review of the extant literature resulted in only one other study that discussed the “small denominator”
effect (Huang et al., 2009). In that study, a $25,000 threshold was utilized to adjust for this issue.
Applying that same threshold in this study would result in the elimination of approximately 5% of my
observations while Huang’s threshold eliminated only 1% of their observations. Therefore, the $1,000
threshold was chosen to limit the number of observations excluded from this analysis. Additionally, using
the threshold from Huang’s study does not change the main result – the sum of the variables of interest is
still not statistically significantly greater than zero (p = .300)

An additional 512 observations were also excluded from this model because audit fees were zero and
therefore, the dependent variable (the ratio of NAS Fees to Audit Fees) could not be calculated.
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The test in Hypothesis 5b is whether the sum of the coefficients for ∆AUDITOR
(β2) and GCMO*∆AUDITOR (β3) is greater than zero. The β2 (∆AUDITOR) coefficient
is 0.152 and the β3 (GCMO*∆AUDITOR) coefficient is -0.156 for a total of -0.004.
Once again, this sum is not statistically significantly greater than zero (p = .814), which
indicates that a client does not purchase additional NAS to compensate the auditor for
lowballing the audit fee (i.e., Hypothesis 5b is not supported).
The control variables SIZE, FORSEGS, and MERGER have a positive and
significant relation (p = .000, .044, and .011, respectively), which is consistent with prior
literature (Elliott et al., 2013; Desire et al., 2014). Similar to prior research, the control
variables that have a negative and significant relation are BM and LIQ (p = .013 and
.001, respectively) (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Whisenant et
al., 2003). Opposite to the expected direction, ICMW, and LOSS are negative and
significant (p = .066 and .000, respectively). Not predicting a direction, I found GCMO,
CFOTURN, and MILLS are negative and significant (p = .008, .057, and .042,
respectively). All other variables are not significant.

Table 12
Regression of NAS FEE to AUDIT FEE RATIO on GCMO * ∆AUDITOR
NAS FEES t / AUDIT FEES t = β0 + β1 GCMOt-1 + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 GCMOt-1*∆AUDITORt + β4 BIG 4t-1 +
β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 RESTATEt-1 + β7 SEGSt-1 + β8 FORSEGSt-1 + β9 BMt-1 + β10 RECINVt-1 + β11 MERGERt-1 +
β12 ICMWt-1 + β13 LOSSt-1 + β14 ROAt-1 + β15 ZSCOREt-1 + β16 LIQt-1 + β17 LEVt-1 + β18 NEWFINt-1 +
β19 CEOTURNt-1 + β20 CFOTURNt-1 + β21 ARLt-1 + β22 YEARt-1 + β23 INDUSt-1 + β24 MILLSt + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficients

T-Stat

p-value

0.468

19.607

0.000

GCMO

?

-0.030

-2.645

0.008

***

∆AUDITOR

?

0.152

12.080

0.000

***

GCMO * ∆AUDITOR

?

-0.156

-6.525

0.000

***

BIG4

+

0.012

1.593

0.111

SIZE

+

0.007

3.548

0.000

***
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RESTATE

+/-

-0.011

-1.277

0.202

SEGS

+

-0.001

0.229

0.819

FORSEGS

+

0.001

2.014

0.044

**

BM

-

-0.007

-2.485

0.013

**

RECINV

+

-0.011

-0.664

0.507

MERGER

+

0.023

2.557

0.011

**

ICMW

+

-0.019

-1.839

0.066

*

LOSS

+

-0.026

-4.243

0.000

***

ROA

-

0.006

1.486

0.137

+/-

0.001

1.136

0.256

LIQ

-

-0.003

-3.185

0.001

LEV

+/-

0.005

-0.522

0.602

NEWFIN

+/-

0.009

1.592

0.111

CEOTURN

+/-

0.008

0..870

0.384

CFOTURN

+/-

-0.016

-1.903

0.057

ARL

+/-

0.000

-1.213

0.225

?

-0.024

-2.032

0.042

ZSCORE

MILLS
Industries

Included

Years

Included

Observations
Adjusted

R2

***

*

**

47,895
0.025

***

Variable definitions can be found in Table 3.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

Hypothesis 5c posits a company receiving a first-time GCMO purchases
additional NAS from their new auditor in order to receive a better opinion. The results
for the Hypothesis 5c model are presented in Table 13. The dependent variable in Table
13 is GCMO and the variables of interest are the ∆AUDITOR and
NASFEES*∆AUDITOR. The Nagelkerke pseudo R2 for this model is 0.530 and the
model Chi Square is significant at 0.000.
The test in Hypothesis 5c is whether the sum of the coefficients for ∆AUDITOR
(β2) and NASFEES*∆AUDITOR (β3) is less than zero. The β2 (∆AUDITOR) coefficient
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is 0.069 and the β3 (NASFEES*∆AUDITOR) coefficient is 0.000 for a sum of 0.069
which again is not statistically significantly different than zero (p = .258) indicating that
a client does not purchase additional NAS to receive a better opinion (i.e., hypothesis 5c
is not supported).
Consistent with prior literature, the control variable LEV is positive and
significant (p = .000) (Blay & Geiger, 2013; Fargher & Jiang, 2008). As predicted based
on prior literature, SIZE and LIQ are negative and significant (both have a p = .000)
(Blay & Geiger, 2013; Fargher & Jiang, 2008). Inconsistent with prior literature, BIG4
and NEWFIN are negative and significant (both have a p = .000). Not predicting a
direction, I found ZSCORE and ARL positive and significant (both with a p = .000).

Table 13
Regression of GCMO on NAS FEES and ∆AUDITOR
GCMOt = β0 + β1 NAS FEESt + β2 ∆AUDITORt + β3 NAS FEESt*∆AUDITORt + β4 BIG 4t-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 +
β6 ZSCOREt-1 + β7 LIQt-1 + β8 LEVt-1 + β9 NEWFINt-1 + β10 ARLt-1 + ε

Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

Coefficient

Wald

p-value

-0.360

44.289

0.000

NAS FEES

?

0.000

0.167

0.683

∆AUDITOR

?

0.069

1.282

0.258

NASFEES*∆AUDITOR

?

0.000

4.870

0.027

**

BIG4

+

-0.513

123.425

0.000

***

SIZE

-

-0.585

3065.243

0.000

***

+/-

0.027

112.131

0.000

***

LIQ

-

-0.081

215.393

0.000

***

LEV

+

0.661

133.597

0.000

***

NEWFIN

+

-0.112

7.244

0.007

***

+/-

0.008

342.999

0.000

***

ZSCORE

ARL
Observations
Pseudo R2
Chi Square

48,414
0.530
16,735.8

***
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Variable definitions can be found in Table 4.
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise.
(***), (**), (*) denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and .0.10 levels, respectively.

In summary, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were not supported. The results did not
indicate a positive relation between GCMO and ∆AUDITFEES nor a relation between
GCMO and ∆NASFEES. Hypothesis 2 was supported for a positive relation between
∆AUDITOR and GCMO. Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported for a relation between
∆AUDITOR and both ∆AUDITFEES and ∆NASFEES. I found support for Hypotheses
4a and 4b that there was a moderating effect on the relationship between ∆AUDITOR
and both ∆AUDITFEES and ∆NASFEES when the issuance of a GCMO occurred.
Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c were not supported – additional NAS were not purchased to
compensate auditors for the additional risk or to compensate for lowballing, and NAS
were also not purchased in order to receive better audit opinion.

CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
5.1 Conclusions
Professional services in the form of audits and NAS have been provided to
companies by accounting firms for many years and the pricing for these services have
been controversial for many years as well (Simunic, 1980). When pricing these services,
firms have attempted low-balling their fees in order to entice companies to continue with
the firm or in many cases, to change to a new firm. At other times, firms have increased
their fees due to potential additional risk associated with providing their services. This
study examined the relation between changing auditors and the change in both audit and
NAS fees and the relation between receiving a GCMO and the change in both audit and
NAS fees. In addition, this study examined the moderating effect of receiving a GCMO
on the relation between changing auditors and the change in both audit and NAS fees.
The results in this study indicate that a first time GCMO has an overall negative
impact on the change in audit fees. This is inconsistent with a majority of the extant
literature where audit fees generally increased when a GCMO was present. It appears
that audit firms may now be decreasing fees in order to either retain their clients or
possibly to assist the client in controlling costs due to the financial hardship of the client
(as indicated by the GCMO). This difference from previous studies could also be the
result of changes in the audit environment since the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which require more corporate responsibility and therefore potentially decreases the risk
associated with the receipt of a going concern modified opinion. Regardless of the
87
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reason, this surprising finding warrants future research on this topic. For NAS fees, the
receipt of a first time GCMO had no significant relation, which indicates that the receipt
of a GCMO does not affect the purchase of NAS.
The receipt of a first time GCMO did have a positive effect on auditor dismissal,
which is consistent with prior literature. Auditors are more likely to be dismissed when a
company receives a first time GCMO. The findings also indicate that when an auditor is
dismissed, there is a negative impact on audit and NAS fees – i.e., when a company
dismisses its auditor, their audit fees tend to decline. This generally indicates that the
new auditor charged less than the previous auditor charged and may be low-balling their
fee to obtain the new client. When a company dismisses an auditor, the NAS fees were
also lower. This could indicate that the company is purchasing fewer services from the
new auditor or the auditor is low-balling their NAS fee prices as well to obtain the new
client.
The crux of this study however, was the examination of the moderating effect of a
first time GCMO on the change in both audit and NAS fees when an auditor is dismissed.
As discussed above, when an auditor is dismissed, audit fees decline. However, a firsttime GCMO had a moderating effect on this relation and in the presence of a GCMO
there was no longer a decline in audit fees when an auditor was dismissed. This could
indicate that the new auditor was concerned with the risk of a new unknown client and
was not willing to low-ball their audit fee. Alternatively, it could indicate that the auditor
has the opportunity to receive higher fees due to the company wanting to change auditors
after the receipt of a GCMO. GCMO also had a moderating effect on the relation
between the change in NAS fees and auditor dismissals and in the presence of a GCMO

89
there was no longer a decline in NAS fees when an auditor was dismissed. This could
indicate that the company was purchasing more NAS to help with the issues that caused
their GCMO.
In trying to ascertain reasons why companies purchase NAS, this study examined
three alternatives. Did the purchase of NAS after receiving a GCMO compensate the
auditor for taking on a more risky client; did the purchase of NAS allow the auditor to
low-ball their audit fees; or did the purchase of NAS allow the client to “buy” a better
opinion? This study did not find statistical evidence to support any of these questions – it
does not appear that NAS are purchased to compensate the auditor for any of these
reasons. Maybe the purchase of NAS is simply to improve the company’s performance
which future research can examine.
5.2 Limitations
The potential limitations that need to be considered in this study are as follows.
First, the time period of this study (2004 – 2014) was selected to represent the relations of
the variables in question in a post-SOX era. As there are observations beginning as early
as 2004 in this study, there may still be some lingering SOX effects in the sample period
(SOX was substantially implemented in 2004, but there were a few provisions where the
implementation date was extended into 2005).
Second, as the sample consisted of U.S. publicly traded companies available in
Audit Analytics and Compustat, the results of the study may not be generalizable to the
entire population of smaller public or private companies and organizations in the United
States nor to companies or organizations domiciled outside the U.S.
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Third, there may be other financial or non-financial incentives for changing
auditors that are not being addressed in this study. Finally, the measure for NAS fees in
this study relates only to those NAS fees that are paid to the auditor. It is unknown if the
companies purchased similar NAS from a different firm. If there were consulting fees
paid to third party providers other than the auditors, these amounts are not included in the
NAS fees and therefore could result in different findings if included.
5.3 Contributions
This study makes many contributions to the literature. Prior literature showed
audit fees increased when a GCMO was received (Desir et al, 2014; Ettredge et al, 2007;
Huang et al, 2009). This study indicates this relationship has changed as audit fees are
actually decreasing in the presence of just a GCMO. This could be a concern for policy
makers as lower audit fees could indicate that low-balling is taking place and could result
in a decline in audit quality. However, it could also be an indication that technology is
improving the audit process, which in turn might reduce audit pricing. This is certainly
an area for future research.
This study also answers the call for replicative studies to ensure prior research
findings hold consistent across time (Carcello et al, 2011; DeFond & Zhang, 2015;
Dyckman & Zeff, 2014). This study did find confirmative evidence that an auditor
dismissal is more likely to occur after the issuance of a first time GCMO.
Another contribution of this study was to address some of the potential concerns
regarding the purchase of NAS to compensate audit firms for taking on more risky
clients, or to reduce their audit fees, or maybe even to “buy” a better audit opinion. The
results in this study indicate that these three concerns may not be an issue.
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